DePaul University

Via Sapientiae
College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences
Theses and Dissertations

College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

6-2012

Orange revolution - post-socialist urban political movement
Kristina Zaluckyj
DePaul University, kzaluckyj@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Zaluckyj, Kristina, "Orange revolution - post-socialist urban political movement" (2012). College of Liberal
Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 121.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/121

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via
Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

1

Orange Revolution – Post-Socialist Urban Political Movement
INTRODUCTION__________________________________________________
Post-socialist urban political movements are occurring throughout the world in various
states. These movements emerge from changes in political democracy and development. When
a previously established socialist system is replaced by one that is democratic, transitions follow.
When the democratic system is still new, the state’s leadership has trouble defining the new
principles from which their political system will operate. During the transition the political
leadership’s activities can stray away from those based in democratic practices. The result is
tension felt between the rule enforcers (the political elite) and the citizens who expect execution
of promised changes. Throughout the transition, the people see what has changed, the remaining
modifications, the developments still expected and what is stagnant. The people react through
protest. This is part of the growing process of a new democratic state.
Such is the case for Ukraine and its Orange Revolution, which responded to the rigged
presidential election of 2004. This thesis reviews the Orange Revolution and its role in postsocialist urban political movements. It is presented through first-hand recollections of citizens
who witnessed and participated in the movement. These people express their observations of the
changes seen, expected and still pending.
The Orange Revolution was a social movement – based on political action. Preceding the
aforementioned event are similar movements in other states seeking change in political
leadership and enacting democratic values. Many urban social movements occurred in states
where socialism was once the approach to all politics and way of life. They include
Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution in 1989; Serbia’s “October 5 th Overthrow” in September
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2000 and Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003. These movements responded to fraudulent
elections. Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution followed the Orange Revolution in 2005, as did
movements in Lebanon and Kuwait. Protests became the means to force transition to a
functioning democratic state. Therefore, post-socialist urban political movements are important
to review as states reform their governmental structures.
Defining post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly see how that
transition is the main reason to spur the movement. These movements occurred in states where
Soviet-style socialism was politically dominant for two or more generations. The most profound
change from the pre-socialist society was the weakening of meritocratic principles of gaining and
sustaining employment in favor of a patronage system, especially the patronage of the dominant
political party. Often described as corrupt, the Party rewarded loyalty and punished dissent and
opposition. Such systems depend on the loyalty and connivance of a large portion of the
population to remain in control. Any evidence that “history” may be moving away from the
Party in power undermines that authority. Protests, if they can bring enough people into the
streets, are strong evidence of a shift in power.
Ukraine’s 2004 election marked the end of President Leonid Kuchma’s tenure. During
his presidency, Kuchma and the oligarchs grew into a strong group whose actions were corrupt.
These activities rooted in corruption, resulted in slowing the growing democratic system’s
development. To preserve their survival, Kuchma and the oligarchs rigged the 2004 presidential
election to get their favorable results (Åslund, Anders and Michael McFaul., eds., 2006, 1).
They wanted to elect Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s preferred candidate and fellow oligarch.
Assurance was desired that Yanukovych would lead the government instead of Viktor
Yushchenko, the candidate that appeared to be greatly supported and preferred by the people.
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Yushchenko, in opposition to Yanukovych, saw that changes were necessary to reinstate
democracy and growth within Ukraine. Thus, Yushchenko’s candidacy was supported by
impatient and disenchanted citizens. This support made his position as a candidate more
concrete. It was further complimented by support from Yulia Tymoshenko, who agreed with
Yushchenko and wanted changes within Ukraine.
The Orange Revolution held the foundation for a social movement: frustration with the
lagging democratic development which created discourse within the state, mobilization of the
people through a charismatic leader and the desire for change to promote the greater good.
However to succeed, the movement needed to bring people into the street. The events that
occurred five years before the Orange Revolution show their service as the catalyst to erupt
change. The acts of corruption, fraud and stagnation of growth challenged the desired
improvements for the state.
Shortly after the events of the Orange Revolution in 2004, scholar Taras Kuzio
acknowledged that the event and the mass protests’ strength emerged from three separate sectors
of Ukrainian society: civil society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the
narod (people) who provided the power behind the crowds and the defectors from the party in
power, who turned their backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29). The people’s frustration of their
current observations and what they desire as an end result for the state solidified in the
immediate political goals of increasing civil participation, and governmental transparency.
This motivated to result in the particular presented case study. Kuzio’s theory on how the
Orange Revolution emerged within the Ukrainian public is reviewed. The key contributing
groups of society in Ukraine are broken down in further discussion. They theory presented by
Kuzio also is assessed as to how it relates to social movement theory. An analysis on how
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Kuzio’s theory deviates from the pre-defined understanding of urban social movements is
presented in this thesis. Kuzio’s theory is also contextualized through the examples provided by
testimonies gathered by the narod as new information surrounding post-socialist urban political
movements.
Though smaller events and activities occurred in the years before Ukraine’s 2004
presidential elections; I argue that the Orange Revolution was an independent event. I also argue
that it resulted from a political election and Yushchenko’s call to action for the people to stand
up to the current political regime. With this, I ask: What was it about the movement or timing of
the Orange Revolution’s emergence that allowed the protest to occur? Why was the Orange
Revolution more than just the vote it surrounded, and was it more than just a social movement?
What changed within Ukraine (if anything) that led the Orange Revolution, thereby encouraging
the public to participate and take to the streets in protest? Finally, what are the implications of
the Orange Revolution in the overall big picture of Ukraine’s political development?
To answer my questions, I rely on primary sources and historical information on this
topic that has already been published. Additionally, I will bring new data to the work of
contemporary historians. The data I present regarding this event consists of oral histories of
individuals who lived in Ukraine before and during the Orange Revolution. Relating their
experiences shows the strong social basis for the appeal of the movement that led to the street
protests. This is despite considerable variation in the positions of the individuals.
My research participants needed to meet a set of qualifications: they were at least 14
years old in 1991 and recall life under socialism. I also requested that the candidates all lived in
Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv, the capital, during the Orange Revolution, even if they subsequently
emigrated. At the time of their interviews, participants were located in the United States –
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Boston, Minneapolis, and Chicago – and throughout Ukraine. Interviews were conducted in
person, through internet telephony (Skype) and email exchanges.
I want to disprove that the Orange Revolution was merely an event where the public and
citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations. I want to prove that the protest and event as a
whole occurred independently from the election and previous events. My prediction is: we will
find that the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous gradual changes that were too
slow for the public to see an end result after they were started. My research findings will be
presented as follows:
1. Background
I. Urban social movements
a. Theoretical approaches
b. Indicate how this information is applicable to Ukraine.
II. Ukraine
a. Understanding Ukraine before the Orange Revolution
i. Information on discourse from within to be included.
b. Dynamics of Post-Soviet corruption.
III. The Orange Revolution
a. Basic history of the event
b. Description of political parties, their key figures and the candidates’ platforms
c. Description of Pora and the group’s role leading up to and during the Orange
Revolution.
i. Additional discussion on assistance Pora received from smaller groups
trained in non-violent protest methods.
2. Oral History from the Orange Revolution
 Participant selection qualifiers, questions posed to participants and methodology of how
the histories were collected and recorded
 Selected narratives showing both common experiences and variations.
 Review of narratives and their correlation to urban social movements.
3. Hypotheses review and assessment
 Review of Kuzio’s hypothesis
 Assess Kuzio’s hypothesis of how the Orange Revolution emerged within the public.
 Determine how and if his argument is supported or disproved by social movement theory
 Determine if my research coincides and agrees with his agreement.
4. Conclusion
 Review overall new findings on urban social movements
 Review new findings on Post-Soviet state corruption
 Assessment of how my research findings can be applied to provide insight to social
movements in other states developing their democracies.
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BACKGROUND____________________________________________________
URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Urban social movements are not a limited phenomena. Many urban social movements
occurred in states where socialism was once the political system and way of life. As a
democratic system emerged within these states, a new thought process followed. This is a result
of socialism being the norm for two or more generations. Competing ideas are visible between
demographical divisions who see different ways of life. Many of these movements emerged
because of political activities involving the concept of one person, one vote, and the lack of civic
participation and transparency. Frustration regarding growing discourse results in protest,
demanding change to encourage a democratic system.
Ultimately, the relationship of such an occurrence and the cause and effect associated is a
result of two things. First, the relationship is not random. Second, it’s evolving and supposed to
happen. Eventually, the end result comes about. It is the combination of a series of smaller
factors which come into play. The tipping point is another factor which spurs the movement to
evolve. That then, becomes the overall, final result. Furthermore, two primary groups are
involved: figures of authority – political power holders, and the general population. The
population sees the power holders’ actions. These actions are questioned by the population
holding certain expectations of what should occur versus what is occurring. It is the way to try
to further establish and promote the transition towards democracy.
Reviewing the concept of post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly
see how that transition is the reason to spur the movement. It is important to review particular
movements within specific cases in order to predict what will likely happen next. The terms of
the democratic system are determined by the state itself as no two democracies are identical.
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How do you define a social movement? Roberta Garner observes that a social movement
“is constituted by human beings engaged in discourses and practices designed to challenge and
change society as they define it. It is formed by people, who over the course of time, are
involved in non-institutionalized discourses and practices of change” (Garner, 1996, 12). The
population sees change is necessary. They desire it to occur and will aid it by means of a social
movement. Collectively, the public can communicate and acknowledge the present discourse
and initiate resolution by modifying internal happenings of the power holders. Civil
participation and transparency must be present to express the frustration of what is observed and
for the desired end result. Urban social movements serve as the motivation for the most wanted
change from within, expressed by both urban and rural populations.
Traditionally, the urban population is driven to participate in such movements. Their
ideology of the event is based in the movement’s opportunity. The urban population in such
situations thrives on this ideology. They seek the opportunity for the movement, the chance to
improve the quality of their life and the possible available options. They are focused on the end
result, regardless of the tension that emerges under such circumstances. The urban population
relies on the rural population to assist with the ideal and contribute to the masses along with their
own desires and motivations. Urban populations want to improve their quality of life and the
potential opportunities available to them. The urban population is more focused on the overall
end result – improvement from the current system. The driving force is the desire to see that
result become a reality.
Rural populations are motivated to participate in the movement and activities within the
state. Additionally, they are more willing to lay their life on the line, sacrificing themselves
while fighting for the cause. They feel their desires and participation helps motivate the wanted
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change. The rural population helps the ideal and contributes to the masses by adding numbers.
The rural population’s passion for the desired change unites them with the urban population.
The urban population is aided by the rural population’s passion and energy. Together, they stand
up for the modifications they commonly want to see and develop, making the change systemic.
In the 20th century, rural movements primarily resulted from taxation, being pushed to the
economic margins of sustainability. Urban movements, conversely, are massive non-violent
demonstrations. Though tensions may run very high during an urban movement, the desire and
act to destroy everything does not occur. Such an act would deflect from the movement’s focus.
Likewise, pro-democracy movements attempt to “limit violent and coercive action against any
human being” (Garner, 1996, 149). The ultimate goal of the movement, and initiating change
from within, is to express the desire for change in a non-violent fashion. Maintaining nonviolent mindsets and actions aids to ensure stability and calm amidst tension. If violent acts
emerge, the potential for internal civil war increases.
Certain factors are necessary for urban social movements to emerge. These factors are:
discourse within the state, mobilizing the people through a charismatic leader and the desire to
promote the greater good to result in a new outcome. The event’s desired outcome is to remodel
the current conditions and environment in the state. Urban social movements challenge the
state’s current activities and system. They try to impose change. There is no guarantee that the
desired outcome will be the end result.
Due to the unstable nature of an outcome, social movements are “natural experiments in
power, legitimating and democracy” (Crossley, 2002, 9). The intent and desire for change is
present. Though, means for executing change must be introduced and performed in a way to
encourage the desired end result. This end result is contingent on the situation and circumstances
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surrounding the movement’s initiation. Charles Tilly’s three main elements of contingency for
social movements are:
1). Campaigns of collective claims on target authorities.
2). An array of claim-making performances which include special-purpose associations,
public meetings, medial statements and demonstrations.
3). Public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment of the cause
(Tilly, 2004, 7).
Social movements need mobilization tactics to engage the public in the overall cause and
encourage their persistent activity. The end result in promoting involvement is ownership and
the value experienced by the citizens after participating in such events. This defines Charles
Tilly’s bottom-up nationalism process. The mobilization leaders reach out to the population
lacking their own representation and establish historical distinctions, coherence, connectedness
and the followers’ determination to claim their right to political autonomy (Tilly, 2002, 68).
Uniting the population and finding commonality for their desires, establishes the foundation for a
social movement. Additionally, a sense of ownership for participation is instilled; thus
furthering personal investment in the event. Together, they can address what they feel may be
wrong within society and express the changes desired for improvement.
Social movements campaign to change existing norms within a state. They express the
collective desire to right wrongs committed and felt by a very specific population (Tilly, 2002,
88). For many of the post-socialist political movements, a stagnated transition to a democratic
system was the primary reason to promote the movement’s emergence. The inception of the new
system, once socialism was removed as the primary practice, was not developing as expected.
During an urban social movement, diverse feelings and emotions can be present and
emerge from those involved. Fear among citizens can exist. This fear results from uncertainty
that their efforts demanding change may be done in vain, and the desired end result may not
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follow. Such an outcome is possible after the protest. Giugni states, “when protest actions are
combined with shifts in public opinion favorable to the movements, the actors’ chances to obtain
a substantial impact on policy should increase and thereby point to a joint effect of protest and
public opinion” (Giugni, 2004, 6-7). In this case study, the public’s opinion did not shift.
Instead, the opportunity to express their pre-existing opinions, without facing serious retribution
for their actions was present.

HOW URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS RELATE TO UKRAINE
Ukrainian citizens had the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the outgoing
presidential regime. The cumulative and indirect effects mediated by the overall environment
socially and politically, were greater and prominent. Combining the desire to end corruption and
manipulation in response to an event holding the potential to either continue the status quo or
change it, resulted in the Orange Revolution. These are factors that made the Orange Revolution
a civil revolution and involved all groups of society. Many of the social movements that
emerged within recent years had a socialistic approach to politics. During the transition to
democracy, an urban social movement materializes. It is a way to help establish the initiated
transitions and advance it toward democracy.
For someone living in Ukraine today, compared to their life during Soviet Ukraine, they
will observe that life has changed quite immensely. These changes are found in their living
opportunities. These opportunities are observed in how and where they live, education and the
structure of their everyday lifestyle for employment. All of these things are now different from
how they were 25 years ago. Therefore, competing ideals exist based on what everyone has
known from the previous era and what they want, and aspire to develop for their future.
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Looking specifically at Ukraine, under the Soviet Union and the Soviet structure, a small
group of political elites always made every decision. It brought about a patron-client
relationship. An example of this relationship and how it carried out is seen in the job market.
Service jobs were often offered in exchange for citizens’ unswerving loyalty. It ensured a job at
a particular company once a set of necessary steps were complete. Other amenities could also be
awarded like a car, appliances, summer home, vacations and assurance that their children will get
into good schools. When Ukraine declared independence and began forming its democratic
system, the driving force of patron-client relations was removed.
The Orange Revolution was an urban social political movement favoring democracy.
After declaring independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union, the government formed, and
agreed to institute a democratic system after Communism. The new system had difficulty
developing under Kuchma between 1994 and 2004. Creating a mass protest against corruption
and cronyism was the public’s way to express their resistance to further manipulation of the
established system and favoring only elite members of society. This is what made the Orange
Revolution a civic movement involving both urban and rural populations of society.
Like Serbia and Georgia, Ukraine’s revolution was brought about by a lack of trust in the
regime. The administration in power attempted to control the vote’s outcome by adjusting it to
their personal preference without regard to the public’s voice. In all three instances, the
revolutionary leaders – the opposition candidate – called the citizens to protest the current
regime’s manipulation. This was the turning point for these movements which clearly declared
their purpose within the state’s democratic development.
Like the revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, Ukraine had an organized youth group trained
specifically to gather crowds, express their dissatisfaction and revolt with control, non-violently.
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These youth groups reached out to the younger voters, encouraging their participation by
expressing their democratic right to support their preferred candidate to lead the state. They
emphasized to the younger generation that their contribution via participation was valued and
needed to be expressed.
Their efforts helped in mobilizing the public, bringing in the element of populism, “a
view and a movement that calls for a mobilization against the rich and powerful in the name of
the people” (Garner, 1996, 184). This element of populism helps reinforce the point that the
Orange Revolution was a norm-oriented movement. Such a movement looks to “alleviate stress
by addressing and transforming the normative structure of the system in which it arises”
(Crossley, 2002, 44). The Orange Revolution was a movement that released growing political
tension. In Ukraine, the people were protesting against the rich and powerful oligarchs.

HISTORY: UKRAINE
Ukraine: Before and During Soviet Times
Before further analyzing the Orange Revolution as a pro-democracy, urban social
political movement, we must review Ukraine’s history. This helps contextualize the event while
acknowledging its relevance within Ukraine’s more recent history. Understanding previous
events also aids in greater insight to current events. Before and during the Soviet era, Ukraine
struggled to find its position within the world. Cultural and linguistic similarities with Russia,
contributed their stronghold on Ukraine. Throughout history, when Ukraine was self-sufficient
and striving toward democratic development, stronger outside forces uprooted and changed the
state’s plans for growth. Despite this, Ukraine had the basis for democratic development.
Before the Soviet Union’s formation, Ukraine experienced several occupations. Western
Ukraine was ruled for over 200 years by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburgs in
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the 1790’s, and in 1867 until the end of World War I by Austria-Hungary. Ukraine briefly
experienced independence in 1917. The Treaty of Versailles partitioned Ukraine to Russia,
Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. By the end of World War II, all of Ukraine was under
Soviet occupation.
In the late 1700’s and early 1800’s, undercurrents of Ukrainian nationalism emerged
through art and literature. From 1863 to 1876 “de-Ukrainianization” efforts were present in
Eastern Ukraine. Language restrictions were imposed by Russia. Ukrainian organizations aimed
to preserve Ukrainian culture and traditions while combating bans. Ukrainian intelligentsia and
nationalists expressed in publications and poetry the need to maintain and uphold national
identity. This group of intellectual elites felt obliged to promote and preserve all aspects of
Ukrainian culture to avoid absorption and vanish in the political overtaking.
The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church helped instill
cohesion among people during the various occupations. The churches aided to maintain a sense
of community and stability. During the Soviet era, Josef Stalin felt threatened by religion as it
challenged his plan for full Sovietization. He wanted to assimilate all cultures of the states
which formed the Soviet Union and abolish religion. Stalin forced unification between the
Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This dissolved the
Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church in 1946, which went underground in Ukraine. Meanwhile,
faithful abroad continued practicing openly. If caught practicing faith, consequences were severe
and included being sent to labor camps in Siberia. The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church
resurfaced in the mid-1980’s. By August 1990, the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv was
reinstated as a Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as it was, prior to the Russian Orthodox
Church’s absorption decades before.

14
Stalin had full authority of the USSR in 1925. He intended socialism to transform the
Soviet Union into a powerhouse. He wanted to surpass the rest of the world in industrial,
agricultural and economic production, regardless of cost. Stalin announced his Five-Year Plan in
October 1928 and forced participation from everyone. He required unattainable grain quotas
which were protested by many Ukrainians working the land and fighting assimilation. All
foodstuff was confiscated as quotas began appearing unattainable. The result was death by
starvation – the Great Famine of 1932-33, killing 11 million people (Subtelny, 1994, 416).
Ukrainian intelligentsia and their nationalism efforts continued in Kyiv and Lviv up until
World War I. Many fled to Western Ukraine for their own safety as they promoted upholding all
aspects of Ukrainian nationalism. As this became more challenging with the onset of World War
I and the Russian Revolution; the intellectuals, including Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko
focused their efforts on preserving the Ukrainian language. They knew by upholding the
Ukrainian language, total Russian assimilation would be more challenging for the authorities.
During the 1950’s Ukraine’s political elite acknowledged needed modifications to uphold
Ukrainian nationalism under Soviet suppression. Upholding nationalism via language, literature,
culture and collective memory helped maintain group cohesion. In the 1960’s and 1970’s,
intense Russification efforts were implemented to counteract the activities of the 1950’s. Bans
of practicing any religion continued.
Ukrainian nationalism was reinstated in the 1980’s. Rukh, “Popular Movement for
Restructuring” actively worked to unite the people and expressed solidarity through nationalism
while declaring its importance within the state. Their message was conveyed through pop music,
quickly catching the youth’s attention. Anti-Soviet sentiments among Ukrainians grew strong
after the nuclear disaster at Chornobyl in April 1986. The catastrophic repercussions were
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silenced for several days. By 1990, Rukh’s membership grew to nearly five million, many
defecting from Ukraine’s Communist Party. The group’s stronghold came from Western
Ukraine, who encouraged a nationalistic spirit throughout the state. Driven by the intellectuals,
Rukh gained further support from all groups and demographics within Ukraine and also from the
Diaspora abroad.

Ukraine – Independence
On August 24, 1991 Ukraine declared independence. Leonid Kravchuk was elected
president of Ukraine on December 1, 1991, when the state also voted for independence from the
Soviet Union. With assistance from Rukh, Kravchuk led the state in a pro-Ukrainian direction,
attempting to overturn the previous decades of de-Ukrainianization efforts. He acknowledged
Ukraine must work towards European integration and not rely heavily on Russia for support.
Kravchuk also emphasized the need to revive the Ukrainian language. Further emphasis for
nationalization was incorporated into education including Ukrainian culture, history, literature
and language. Said course and more time for the humanities were added while reducing Russian
grammar and literature lessons (Wanner, 1998, 85). This was to reestablish Ukrainian
nationalism and Ukrainian identity for its citizens.
Ukraine introduced the coupon as its currency. It replaced the rouble, showing economic
and monetary independence from Russia. The coupon was unsuccessful in stabilizing inflation
and salaries stagnated. To help curb inflation and ease economic transition, in 1996,
Yushchenko replaced the coupon and introduced the hryvnia. This was one of several
accomplishments during his term as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine. Trading of
goods internationally began and Ukraine’s internal economic stability was recognized.
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Regarding political structure, Ukraine had to start fresh. The state’s political structure
and actions of the political leaders were challenged in growth and development. Ukraine’s early
politicians, accustomed to Communist-style rule, were active in the Soviet government. Forming
the political structure was difficult due to the ingrained Communist-style rule and practices. The
democratic system was very new. Learning and applying principles based in democracy needed
constant review and consistent use. Eliminating old, familiar techniques and implementing new
democratic methodologies opened the door for corruption and political instability. Examples
include exchanging goods for services provided (household items for completing work), and
grand gifts in exchange for loyalty (a summer home to ensure party loyalty).
To successfully transition Ukraine politically, economically and nationalistically,
President Kravchuk needed strong support within government. He named Leonid Kuchma prime
minister. Kuchma ran against Kravchuk for president in 1994 and won. His primary task upon
his election was to establish a rubric by which to abide. He made numerous changes to the
Constitution. Reforms were necessary as Ukraine’s Constitution was composed in 1978.
Agreeing to decided reforms was difficult within government; so, Kuchma initiated his favorite
tactic to get what he wanted – intimidation. A new Constitution was adopted in June 1996.
Once president, Kuchma began using numerous persuasive tactics to push his personal
agenda. Quickly, he implemented a full plan of corruption, fraud, manipulation, abuse and
ulterior motives of self-given power and cronyism, challenging the state. The oligarchs emerged,
as did multiple acts of corruption. Despite this, Kuchma announced several times that Ukraine
was ready to strive towards Europeanization and join the EU and WTO.
Kuchma ran for reelection in 1999, reiterating the desire for EU membership. He ran
against Communist Party leader, Petro Symonenko. After reelection, the truth about Kuchma
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surfaced through crony capitalism, economic and political reforms. He continued intimidating,
which proved positive for task completion. In April 2000, Kuchma proposed a referendum on
constitutional changes, assaulting the democratic consolidation process (Protsyk, 2005, 25).
At the start of Kuchma’s second term, Yushchenko was named Prime Minister and
Tymoshenko Deputy Prime Minister. Quickly, they saw high amounts of corruption within the
state. Both observed corruption’s infiltration into economics and international trade relations.
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko agreed to focus their efforts to eliminate the oligarchs and clean
up economic relations in Ukrainian politics. Realizing their goals in March 2000, President
Kuchma, said both needed to be destroyed (Wilson, 2005a, 49). Tymoshenko was fired from her
post in January 2001. She did not let her dismissal fall by the wayside. On February 9, 2001,
she organized the National Salvation Forum intending to impeach Kuchma. She was arrested a
few days later. Yushchenko was dismissed in April 2001. Anatolii Kinakh replaced
Yushchenko, becoming the eleventh Prime Minister since 1991. This switch was based on
Kuchma’s anger towards an implemented reform policy to pay pensions.
During his presidency, Kuchma had a near monopoly on all power: economic, within the
media – primarily television – and political, regarding elections. In 1996, former Prime Minister
Pavlo Lazarenko bribed Kuchma with $3.7 million as starter capital for mobile phone company,
Kyïvstar (Wilson, 2005a, 39). Lazarenko was caught and indicted. Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s
major steel works company also faced privatization. In June 2004, the company was privatized
for $800 million by Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk (Åslund, 2005, 341).
Citizens witnessed the oligarchs revel in their rich financial gains from business deals and
privatizing companies. Meanwhile, citizens experienced minimal possibility of living a more
affluent lifestyle. Their livelihoods stagnated, much like the changes Kuchma proposed during
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his reelection campaign. Ukraine’s GDP was steady during the Kuchma administration, though
inflation was high. This was caused by corruption by the oligarchs. To date, rampant corrupt
acts and political instability affect the economic system and trade relations with the West.
With the Kuchma administration’s monopoly on television as a news source, many
people turned to other media. Reports were limited and constrained by the government’s strong
censorship rules. The public was fully aware of the government’s media manipulation and
censorship. Such censorship was carried over from the Soviet era.
The attempted cover-up of the kidnapping and decapitation of opposition journalist
Heorhiy Gongadze in September 2000 challenged the position of Kuchma’s government.
Gongadze founded the internet-based newspaper Ukrainska Pravda which focused on
publicizing government acts. Gongadze published an exposé on September 5, 2000 on
Kuchma’s confidant, Oleksadr Volkov, setting Kuchma over the edge. Kuchma was highly
suspected of direct involvement in Gongadze’s disappearance; ergo, the scandal was dubbed
“Kuchmagate.” His involvement was suspected because of audiotapes made by his security
guard, Mykola Melnychenko, which indicated Kuchma was well informed of the murder.
Melnychenko and his family fled to Czech Republic fearing their safety. The publicized murder
motivated Kuchma and the oligarchs to continue their acts and reinforce relations with Russia.
The case’s handling, and the government’s denial appalled citizens when an investigation
led to inconclusive results. In revolt, “Ukraine without Kuchma” began in central Kyiv fighting
to impeach Kuchma based on the murder scandal. The initial campaign amounted to 20,00030,000 protestors. A second wave of demonstrations occurred February 6, 2001, when
parliament reopened (Wilson, 2005a, 58). The movement failed because organizers were unable
to build their coalition to the strength necessary to demand exposure of the pending case.
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Despite the Gongadze scandal’s deteriorating effects, the Kuchma regime prepared for
the 2004 presidential election. Kuchma and the oligarchs took advantage of their powers and
began planning their fight via sabotage. The world quietly observed Kuchma’s actions. His
forcefulness and brazen efforts to assure task completion done per his preferences led Kuchma to
be uninvited to the NATO Summit in November 2002 in Prague. He still attended and was
shunned by his peers (D’Anieri, 2003, 59).
Kuchma was reluctant to step down as president as his second term concluded. He
realized there was no possibility for the two-term maximum rule to be overturned for him. As a
strong member of the oligarchs and supporters of their activities, Kuchma needed to hand pick
someone to represent them in the election. Selecting a person to support; needed thought.
Yanukovych was Ukraine’s third prime minister during Kuchma’s second presidential
term. Kuchma knew Yanukovych’s reputation. He was confident that corruption would become
a way of life in Ukraine if Yanukovych was elected. However, Kuchma did not fully trust his
colleague. Even so, Yanukovych quickly became Kuchma’s right hand man as prime minister.
Corruption and other ill-related acts already occurred within government and ran rampant once
Yanukovych became prime minister. Naming Yanukovych to this position was a strategic move
within the oligarchs and their growing clique.
Yanukovych stood out among the oligarchs with his brash personality and reputation. He
endured a rough childhood in Donetsk, the most criminalized city in Ukraine. In 1968, when
Yanukovych was 18, he was imprisoned for robbery. Two years later, he was charged with
assault. His harsh and uncouth personality emerged during incarceration. While in prison,
Yanukovych earned the nickname “kham” or scum and established himself as a verbally and
physically violent person (Wilson, 2005a, 13). His criminal records disappeared in 1978 and
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resurfaced in 2004 in Moscow. Yanukovych’s criminal past became a contention point for
Ukrainian citizens during the 2004 elections.
To deflect from the negative concerns, the oligarchs gave Yanukovych a makeover.
They dressed him in well-fitted, presentable suits and sent him to the United States to learn how
to speak like a politician. This effort did not improve Yanukovych’s image with the public.
Further dislike and ridicule emerged when Yanukovych officially submitted his candidacy
documents. His Curriculum Vitae was laden with spelling and grammatical errors and was
submitted hand-written to the Central Election Commission.
Viktor Yushchenko was the opposition candidate, favored by the people. Yushchenko’s
activity in politics began during his time as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine. He took
the position in 1993 and held until 1999, when he became prime minister. After his dismissal as
prime minister, Yushchenko created his political party “Our Ukraine” in January 2002. The
party emphasized and promoted Ukrainian language and cultural nationalism. The parliamentary
election of 2002 helped solidify Our Ukraine’s position in Ukrainian politics after winning 101
of the 450 parliamentary seats (Yushchenko, 2007).
Tymoshenko supported Yushchenko and held similar political views. Her career began
and boomed during the mid 1990’s in the oil industry. She entered politics when nominated to
run in the 1996 parliamentary elections. She became deputy chief of the “Hromada Party”
(Tymoshenko, 2007). In late 1999 and early 2000, Tymoshenko started learning Ukrainian. She
projected a nationalistic image and furthered it by forming her own political party – the
Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) Party. Her party was in opposition to Kuchma and his
administration. In December, 2001, her political party was reformed. With the reformation, it
was nicknamed BYuTy.
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Our Ukraine refocused its platform just before the 2004 presidential elections. Instead of
accentuating economic reforms and Ukrainian nationalism, the party stressed European
integration, ascension into the EU, NATO and WTO. On July 2, 2004, Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko joined forces and announced their partnership for the campaign. Together, they
formed the People’s Power Coalition. Their pact ensured Tymoshenko would not run for
president. Instead, she would support Yushchenko and campaign for him. Additional campaign
rallying support came from politicians Borys Tarasyuk and Yuri Kostenko (Åslund, Anders and
Michael McFaul, eds., 2006, 39).

BACKGROUND: ORANGE REVOLUTION
Kuchma and the oligarchs flourished rapidly becoming multi-millionaires filching gained
profits from business deals. Along with the manipulations and abuse of power, Kuchma still did
not want to be exempt from the election. He argued that the two-term maximum rule for
presidents was not applicable to him as it went into effect after his inauguration in 1994. Many
did not support his reasoning.
Towards the end of his presidency, Kuchma pushed to give parliament more power. At
the same time, Kuchma assured his authority remained intact. This complimented his ruling
hand in matters and caused the political system to be more parliamentary than presidentialparliamentary. Doubts were raised if the reforms would strengthen democracy and develop
governance in Ukraine (Protsyk, 2005, 26). This systemic change was made official on
December 8, 2004, and gave protestors during the Orange Revolution additional fighting fuel.
Kuchma was already strongly disliked for the malevolent tactics he used against parliament and
Ukraine’s citizens during his second term.
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Yushchenko, out of office, saw state development stagnate. He wanted to implement
changes in the state and decided to campaign for president. Tymoshenko also wanted changes.
She and Yushchenko held the same opinions and created their pact, guaranteeing her support for
Yushchenko. Tymoshenko’s party – YTB, and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine became allies in the
election, while maintaining their own political identities.
Yushchenko’s driving forces were his political party, campaign promises and argument
that the Kuchma administration detoured from its platform five years prior. He vocalized that
the public’s expectations of the Kuchma administration were never met. The younger generation
wanted to see more growth and state development from the government. Developing Ukraine
both economically and democratically would help with exchanges between neighbors and
trading partners. Working with international business partners, as well as possible study abroad
and other exchange opportunities, would also greatly benefit the youth.
The overall feeling that life in Ukraine was no longer improving and state development
stagnated, emerged among citizens during the Kuchma administration. This sentiment grew
stronger during the 2004 presidential campaign. The stagnation directly affected the public’s
lives, making everyday life more difficult than before. This mobilized citizens who wanted to
right the wrongs they saw. They felt that a controlled and limited set of information was
presented. The expected growth and development briefly witnessed by citizens from ten to
fifteen years earlier suddenly stopped. Instead, the privatization and re-privatization of
companies and businesses grew. Only a political figurehead could stand up and lead the masses
to push for change, verbalizing the previously sensed discourse. The opportunity to demand
change emerged through the presidential elections.
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Like elections in other states, Yushchenko and Yanukovych had very different political
platforms. Both candidates rallied and visited cities throughout Ukraine while connecting with
voters. Additionally, both received support from varied demographics. Yushchenko’s
supporters were younger citizens. Older people receiving pensions and reliant on state funds
primarily supported Yanukovych. Yanukovych’s platform focused on returning Ukraine to the
ways of the Soviet Union. He argued all major institutions were established during that era and
therefore, they should return to the Soviet structure (Copsey, 2005, 101). From his first
campaign day, Yushchenko proposed democracy and democratic growth if elected president. He
incorporated this as a major theme in his political platform knowing the public wanted change.
With this, he became the face of democracy and hope of a democratic system within Ukraine.
In December 2003, Kuchma forewarned that the upcoming presidential elections would
be the dirtiest in Ukraine’s history. All acts of trickery Kuchma and his cronies planned were
devised for strategic implementation while denying involvement. The plans emerged as Kuchma
realized the vote must be rigged to result in his favor. A key trick used during the election was
manipulating absentee voting, a very easy way to stuff ballot boxes favoring Yanukovych
(Oleshko, 2004a, 39). Many of Yushchenko’s campaign posters were vandalized and removed
by the Kuchma administration. More tricks emerged through television, claims that
Yushchenko’s candidacy was part of an American plot, violent acts, extremist groups,
intimidating and forcing regional governors and state institutions to support Yanukovych, or risk
unemployment (Kuzio, 2005, 42).
The most severe trick, directed at Yushchenko, nearly took his life. He had dinner with
Security Services of Ukraine, SBU head Ihor Smeshko and deputy, Volodymyr Satsiuk on
September 5, 2004. Yushchenko received an intense dose of dioxin poison during the dinner.
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He was rushed to Austria for medical attention later that night. Kuchma is highly suspected in
being involved in plotting this activity as he worked closely with Smeshko and Satsiuk. A few
months later, the specific dioxin was confirmed as Agent Orange. While recovering in Austria,
Tymoshenko stepped in and campaigned on Yushchenko’s behalf. After his return home upon
initial treatment from the poisoning, 70,000 people welcomed him (Wilson, 2005a, 123).
The presidential election was scheduled for October 31, 2004. Over 20 presidential
candidates were listed on the ballot. Both Yushchenko and Yanukovych won 39% of the overall
vote. A winner was not produced, forcing a runoff vote on November 21, 2004. Preparing for
the runoff, Tymoshenko urged citizens to get out to vote and publicly stand up for Yushchenko.
After the runoff vote on November 21, the Central Election Commission declared
Yanukovych president, citing he won by a 3% margin over Yushchenko. In response,
Yushchenko immediately called his supporters to come to Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti
(Independence Square) and protest the announced results non-violently. From his first call to
action for protest, Yushchenko stressed the necessity of remaining non-violent. Maintaining
calm in an environment with high tension and emotions, Yushchenko and Pora knew that the
protest’s pro-democracy movement must be nonviolent to avoid a possible riot situation. He felt
all human lives were highly valuable.
As Kuchma controlled many of the television stations, many citizens turned to other
media for updates on the campaign and election. The Orange Revolution is distinguished as
being one of the first technologically-based post-socialist urban political movements. Use of cell
phones, text messaging, internet and email played a notable role among the people.
Technologically-based media aided in organizing and managing the crowds and their
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participants. The use of technology to this extent is strongly acknowledged. Between 2003 and
December 2004, about 12.37% of Ukraine’s population used the internet (Dyczok, 2006, 220).
Every development in the protest was published on the web, giving the world a view
from the trenches, witnessing the event’s details as they happened. The Orange Revolution was
the first major movement detailed and broadcast through the internet for the world to see and
share in the experience simultaneously. Yushchenko’s team and Pora utilized technology to
forward critical information through non-traditional media in Ukraine. This maintained their
momentum and organization during the movement.

PORA
Yushchenko received additional support from Pora (literally translated “Now’s the
Time”). The group acted as a networking organization which aided to unite Yushchenko’s
supporters. Pora’s main goal was to reinstall democracy and democratic practices in Ukraine
and requested these rights through civil actions. It was a residentially based organization and
“forged a sphere of local citizenship that involves citizens directly in the management of their
collective affairs and that mobilizes them when necessary” (Holson, 2008, 247).
Pora, inaugurated in March 2004, became the largest state-wide network of NonGovernmental Organizations, activities and volunteers (Åslund, and McFaul, eds., 2006, 86).
The group overcame the challenge of uniting social, cultural and administrative differences as
well as within Ukraine, regional diversity for democracy. It was organized through core leaders,
a volunteer network, informational campaign and the push for free and fair elections. In total,
150 different national, regional and local NGO’s joined Pora’s efforts (Åslund, 2006, 88).
The group’s core members completed extensive training in crowd control, and nonviolent practices. They aided to maintain a civil environment in the tent camps, where many
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people resided during the Orange Revolution day in and day out. Pora networked with
businesses to gain additional support and effectively communicate information and requests for
help. During the 2004 campaign, Pora informed and mobilized voters. Their slogans
encouraged younger citizens to vote, promoted anti-Kuchma sentiment and held “practice”
protests during the campaign. Pora relied heavily on technology to communicate critical
information to their supporters via the internet, emails and text messages.
The group focused their efforts on the younger voters, near university campuses and
within student organizations. Through rapport building, extensive training and non-violent
reaction, reliance on technology and targeting a specific demographic of the population, Pora
became a strong ally for Yushchenko. Ultimately, Pora became the backbone of public support.
Combining these facets with their mission helped involve the youth and encourage them to voice
their preference for the next president and what they desire next for the state. In contrast,
Yanukovych viewed Pora as a terrorist group, which in turn caused more youth to dislike him
(Kuzio, 2005, 40).
Pora helped Yushchenko address the two main targets of the social movement. He,
along with Tymoshenko challenged the power holders of the current administration while Pora
worked with and led the general public. This way, pressure was put on everyone – leaders and
the masses who follow them. Pora was influential in keeping the crowds calm and offered
direction to refute the announced election outcome. Yushchenko’s grassroots nature of the
campaign also sensitized the population to the overall cause they were fighting for – an honest
and democratic election.
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ORAL HISTORIES FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION______________
CRITERIA
After reviewing general information and characteristics of post-socialist urban political
movements, and the events before and during the Orange Revolution, it is necessary to review
testimonials and oral histories of this specific event. Oral histories not only confirm the
historical events documented by researchers, they also add a human element to the Orange
Revolution. These testimonials of personal experiences add value to the movement as it would
not have occurred without the participation of the people residing in the state.
To complement the already published findings on this particular topic, I sought out new
research. My primary goal of this research was to disprove that the Orange Revolution was
merely an event where the public and citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations. I wanted
to prove that the protest and event as a whole occurred independently from any other event or
activity. I predicted that I would find the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous
gradual changes that were too slow for the public to see an end result. My overall hope in
conducting my research was to better understand the event’s outcome and how it advances
Ukraine’s democratic growth.
To conduct my research, I needed to set criteria for my prospective participants. While
initiating my interviews, I needed to qualify participants before interviewing them. Potential
participants were located at the time of their interviews in the United States, specifically, Boston,
Chicago and Minneapolis. Others were located throughout Ukraine. Requirements of my
participants included that they were at least 14 years old in 1991 and have memories of life under
socialism. Additionally, my interview candidates all lived in Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv,
Ukraine’s capital, during the Orange Revolution. Subsequent emigration was acceptable. I
began my recruitment process by asking people already within my circle of acquaintances to
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relate their experiences to me. From there, I asked these acquaintances to aid me in recruiting
others in their wider circle of contacts to reach out to me directly and relay their experiences, if
they so desired. These people, beyond my circle, had the opportunity to decline participation
without my ever knowing they were contacted. In total, about 20 people provided their histories
and experiences. These histories were told by participants via in person interviews, Skype and
email exchanges. The questions I asked during all interviews were as follows:





















Tell me about life during Soviet times; specifically during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
What was life like at the start of independence?
Tell me your memories during the state of Ukraine’s independence.
What changes occurred immediately after independence? How long did these same
changes continue?
What were the general sentiments about life during Kuchma’s second term in office? For
example – Was it easier or harder to buy items or obtain services? What kinds of items
were available for purchase that were not possible during Soviet times?
During Kuchma's second term in office and the time leading up the 2004 elections, what
were your thoughts and viewpoints on politics?
Share with me your overall feelings, sentiments leading up to the election. Did you
experience any changes in your own life that were affected by the upcoming election?
Did the upcoming election itself make you take a more pro-active stance?
Did you participate in the election? Had the election happened under different
circumstances, would you have participated by voting? Why or why not?
During the Orange Revolution, what were your feelings, sentiments? Did your friends,
family, colleagues have the same feelings?
During these elections, what was the most prominent moment for you?
What were your expectations from these elections and the revolution?
How did you communicate with others during the Orange Revolution? Telephone? Text
message? Email?
Who did you communicate with outside of your primary location during the protests to
exchange updates? Where were they located?
Tell me about the atmosphere during the revolution.
How did the atmosphere change, if at all, after the revolution?
What were your primary expectations that would occur as a result of the revolution?
Tell me about life now after the Orange Revolution. Has your life improved or
worsened? Did the circumstances change?
Did the result of the Orange Revolution directly change your life in any way? How?
During your entire life, when did you feel the most patriotic/nationalistic?
Should an event similar to the Orange Revolution occur again in Ukraine, would you
participate? Why or why not?
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Interviews were conducted either in Ukrainian or English, depending on the participant’s
language preference. Interviews conducted in Ukrainian were translated by me into English. All
names have been changed to conceal the participants’ identity. Further anonymity is presented
by not identifying my participants’ hometowns, unless they disclosed this information in
referencing their location. My focus was to interview people who participated in the main
demonstrations of the Orange Revolution in Kyiv. However, I also interviewed people
throughout Ukraine. The feedback and answers received from these interviews in some ways
challenged the acknowledged division within the state. Religiously, linguistically and culturally
Ukraine has been divided east and west. The responses I received to my questions eliminated
some of the perceived division. At the same time however, difference in opinions and
experiences remain.
To start, I asked my participants about their recollections of life before 1991, during
Soviet times. A simpler life during the Soviet Union existed. There were few surprises from day
to day. Resources were available to people at a set standard.

Soviet Ukraine
“This was my childhood and school years. I wasn’t into politics yet… but I learned…
From this era, I have positive memories as a young person and I was content. I remember one
time, I noticed my father, by the dim light, listening to the radio program “Voice of America.”
Dad was disturbed that I saw this, and when I asked him what he was doing, he answered “I’m a
Communist – I am allowed to listen to them.” As I grew up a bit, I often listened to “Svoboda,”
“Voice of America” and other such programs. I even searched for radio stations and tuned into
them… Listening to the channels was fairly difficult – due to the Soviet work of frequency
interference as the programs were blocked.”
~~~Petro.
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“My childhood was during this era. From my childhood, I have good memories, so I
have good impressions of this era. During this time, many people had access to full rights, but
not everyone. Above all, people felt more protected, secure than what they did during the 1990’s
and early 2000’s.”
~~~Volodya.
“There wasn’t much joy or major excitement for anyone. It often felt very sad, solemn.
We were corralled and herded about like cattle. Individualism did not exist. During the Soviet
era, there was nothing – no hope, no grand opportunities. You just did your everyday activities
and put one foot in front of the other. Conformity abounded.”
~~~Bohdan.
“I was born in the early 1950’s. In Pidhajtsi, all my life, there was the foundation of a
church. My parents, aunt and uncle with their family and others from the village started building
the church before World War II. The church’s foundation and walls about five feet high stood
complete. The War paused everything. When Russian occupation occurred and along with the
banning of practicing any form of religion, including Catholicism, the building of the church
stopped completely. The partially built structure remained dormant through my adult years. It
wasn’t that resources and building materials were not available. These items were available –
just not for these types of structure.
Prior to my birth, Pidhajtsi’s general population consisted of three groups of people.
About one third of the population was Ukrainians, another third was Polish and the remaining
third consisted of a Jewish community. Of course, this changed. By the time I was a young girl,
many of the Polish and Jewish populations left and moved elsewhere. Ukrainians remained and
became the majority of the population. Even a few people from other villages moved to our
small town. A lot of “Moskali” – those from Russia – were transplanted and moved to Pidhajtsi.
They never spoke or learned a word of Ukrainian, and only spoke Russian to communicate. One
of my neighbors who lived down the road was one of these transplanted people. During her
entire life, she never uttered a word of Ukrainian, only Russian.”
~~~Nadia.
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“The Soviet years of the 1970’s were my childhood and the 1980’s – my youth. From
1970 through 1986, was perhaps the most peaceful and mild for people in Ukraine within the last
40 years. Truly, during that time, all of the citizens of the USSR lived in almost equal status.
When we talk about disparity during that time, some of today’s historians use the difference in
earnings and economic security as well as the possibility of those who held high positions in the
party. It is worth remembering that if this difference existed, it was hardly noticeable. The
difference in economic status was not high. Differences were developing in the area of
professions, i.e., their higher earnings, and not as a result of thievery of what belongs to the
people. That is thievery of what belongs to the people. That is, thievery of state properties, as it
is happening today.
I was born and grew up in a simple, working village family. In the early 1960’s, my
parents moved from the village to Kirovohrad. My mother got a job in a brick factory and my
father worked for the police department. After I was born, my father changed his job and
worked as a carpenter in construction, and my mother left her job and managed the household.
After working three years in construction, my father, in 1970 received without any cost to
him, from the government, a new two-room apartment. It is worth noting that this opportunity
was also available to most residents of Soviet Ukraine. During that period, there was no
unemployment. My father earned pay that was sufficient to support his family – wife and a
child. His wages covered the cost of groceries, apartment maintenance, buy all clothing, help
parents, take family vacations and maintain some savings.
Food choices were considerably lesser than today. There were very few imported
products. However, the quality was very high in comparison to what is available today.
Nonetheless, foodstuff was adequate. There was very good food selection. The public had very
good opportunities to buy for the holidays a sufficient quantity of fine quality production at
reasonable prices.
From 1970-1985, citizens of the USSR and Ukraine wore clothing made in the USSR.
Imported items were handled exclusively by high-end establishments. Domestically-made
products were of low quality and at low prices. The style of clothing and footwear were not of
modern design. Foreign cars were not sold, and the domestic units were not manufactured in
sufficient quantities – therefore, shortages existed.
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In the 1980’s, all citizens of the USSR had full medical coverage at no cost to them.
Clinics were available even in small villages. Regional and district hospitals were equipped with
all necessary medical technology, hospital beds and such. All healthcare, food and time in the
hospital were at no charge to every citizen.”
~~~Viktor.
“I do not associate myself with politics whatsoever. I’m not one bit interested in the
topic, though life is influenced by politics. I’m forced to acknowledge this fact, despite my
personal feelings. My passion lies in my hobby – philately. I can see politics emerge via
postage stamps. During the Soviet Union era, stamps were very bland. Only a few colors were
used and the images were basic. The images were neutral within the Soviet Republics.”
~~~Taras.
“The educational system in the Soviet Union was one of structure that was consistent
throughout. Curriculum was highly focused on sciences and math. The mode of language for
classes was Russian. After high school, specialization degrees and vocational schools were very
popular. Finals were given at the end of every school year. Sometimes how well a student did
on their oral final exams did not correctly reflect how well they knew the material, but what kind
of gift they presented to their instructor in appreciation for the knowledge they shared.”
~~~Mychajlo.
Independence – 1991
My participants also discussed their recollections from when Ukraine declared
independence and the initial years that followed. They noticed many changes especially in
lifestyle and resources. Feelings of uplift and excitement were very common among my
participants along with some initial concerns once changes became noticeable.
“Up until independence in 1991, I remember things being quite sad, almost dismal.
When Ukraine declared independence, there was a lot of happiness and excitement. Everyone
wanted to celebrate, but after a while, shock set in and the questions of “Now what? Where do
we go from here? What do we do next?” regarding democratic building came about.
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I quickly noticed changes in my classes at the time of independence. Most of my lessons
in school were taught in Ukrainian even before independence. I did have a few classes taught in
Russian. Classes taught in Russian, including Russian language were quickly minimized. I can
still speak to someone in Russian if or when necessary and do it with ease and also transition
between Ukrainian and Russian. However, as a Ukrainian citizen, and out of principle, I prefer
to speak with others in Ukraine using Ukrainian.”
~~~Mykola.
“The curriculum in Ukrainian schools began to change. Science and math subjects
remained strong. Subjects relating more to Ukrainian language, history and cultural studies were
introduced and Russian subjects became less frequent. The biggest change was in fact, the push
to include Ukrainian language classes and ensure they were being taught in schools.”
~~~Mychajlo.
“I was always intrigued by American culture as a kid. I wanted to know more about
American life, lifestyle, culture – everything. After independence, you started seeing American
influences come into Ukraine. The most iconic association with American lifestyle introduced to
Ukraine after 1991 was McDonald’s. Though, the novelty of it is more fascinating than
anything. Like Americans, we could now order a Big Mac and fries.”
~~~Bohdan.
“When Ukraine became independent, postage stamps had a more nationalistic sentiment
within them. The Trident was being implemented almost as often as an American flag for
common postage in the United States. Flowers, especially poppies and bachelor buttons which
are both popular in Ukraine were also visible. Colors on the stamps became more vibrant and
images more detailed. The stamps grew into pieces of artwork.”
~~~Taras.
“The church that started being built even before I was born remained untouched until
independence. Shortly after Ukraine declared independence, when it became more acceptable to
practice religion publicly, the people of Pidhajtsi worked to complete the church’s construction.
Around 1997, the church was finished and we were actually able to start holding Masses,
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weddings, baptisms and celebrate religious holidays. A few years later, we started building a
second church in Pidhajtsi.”
~~~Nadia.
“Everything from the stores vanished just before independence. Life became terrible.
Right after independence, authorities elevated themselves in importance and people were then
lowered in value.”
~~~Maksym
“Items became more available, but there was nothing to buy them with – no money.
Nothing was stable.”
~~~Danylo.
“During Soviet times, people did not have much money, but goods were available. After
independence, people had money but goods were scarce. This is the biggest thing I remember
from this time. The shift from goods being available to their lacking and the shift in funds to get
goods was very pivotal for me. This change really struck me one day in 1992, when I went out
to buy toilet paper. Hardly any toilet paper was left on the shelf, whereas before it was
plentiful.”
~~~Roman.
“Goods were limited and their quality was not always the best. I was fortunate to receive
on occasion bits of care packages of gently used clothes from my cousin’s relatives in Canada. I
would get the occasional pair of pants or sweater if certain clothing items did not fit my uncle.
We would all wear these items with great care and pride. In one package, my aunt received a
bottle of perfume. She used the perfume only for special occasions.”
~~~Vasyl.
“Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, citizens, on average, lived a fairly good and
comfortable life. In general, people had access to most all basic necessities. I think the Soviet
Union fell apart because of the communist ideology and the government system. It was during
the mid-1980s that the government started having difficulties in monitoring the pre-set, high
standard of living for its citizens.
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The economic structure was based on the principle of strict control by the central
government. From my point of view, in the beginning of the 1990’s, the complex socioeconomic relations, the development of lawlessness, corruption, the lack of laws regulating the
transition to a market economy, the desire of the party and government functionaries of the
USSR to divide political and economic influences, was the cause of the breakup of the Soviet
Union. At that time, and thereafter, there was no conversation about the desire of Ukraine to
become independent. This idea was trumped by the functionaries of the Communist criminals
with the desire of self-enrichment and to take ownership of the state’s wealth.
When Ukraine gained independence, in the beginning of the 1990’s; that was the period
of expectations and disappointments. It was the beginning of poverty, unemployment, rapid
development of criminal activities. Extremely high inflation, ruining of business establishments
by the wild privatization, the senseless distribution of properties and after their take over were
sold dirt cheap as though they were pieces of scrap metal. The public could not take its savings
from the banks; the accounts were frozen. These were very difficult years. But, at the same
time, people believed that any day the statesmen would institute law and order. Yes, during this
period many people were becoming very rich very quickly, but some not for long. The standard
of living for most people was low. City dwellers were growing gardens massively.
Some establishments were not paying the workers their salaries. Instead, the idea of
bartering was used. In other words, whatever the factory produced, the workers would receive
that product as compensation – bricks, sugar, furniture, alcohol, etc. Also, poor quality items
like clothing, food, alcoholic beverages, etc were produced in massive quantities, all because of
the lack of government controls.”
~~~Viktor.
“I was studying in college at this time and majoring in history. I actively participated in
events through various student groups focused in politics. I helped out with the AmericanCanadian organization “Active Freedom” in agitation and went to public rallies.
Regarding goods and services, things were not pleasant… The coupon was introduced.
When working on my graduate studies, my interest in politics continued. Truly, there
was resistance of the idea of popularizing and using Ukrainian. In Luhansk, you almost never
heard it anywhere (aside from the smaller towns, villages and handful of oblasts). Other than
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that, Ukrainian was hardly used during that time. Government officials started using Ukrainian
more regularly and started publishing laws and all official documents in Ukrainian. There was a
definite rise in crime, blaming it on someone, some wickedness – hit men, gunmen were hired to
kill businessmen and other leaders. But everyday life was not affected much.”
~~~Petro.
“Sneaky, clever people started grabbing at the goods that were around. Thievery started
throughout. The people who cared for Ukraine could not fully manage the state rebuilding. The
higher leadership was organized with a few patriots and mostly of brotherhoods of professionals
(career men) and thieves. Capital gains started to grow with the authorities, the bandits started
using bribery, buying off the leaders and law makers.
The years after independence, I was studying at the institute. Goods for purchase in
stores were limited, transportation was unstable. Regarding law, total corruption did not exist
yet, so they could still control the bandits. They dimmed the lights on economy.
At the institute in 1993, problems started with the heating and electricity. They started
withholding, delaying issuance of paychecks. This continued for years. Instead of pay, they
gave IOU or barter notes, then, they paid in the form of goods – vodka among other items.”
~~~Volodya.
“In school, I had some classes taught in Russian. We had lessons in Russian before
independence. After independence, class information was less frequently being taught in
Russian and more in Ukrainian. By the time my younger sister started grade school in Ternopil,
there were no more classes taught in Russian. My sister finished her undergraduate studies in
Journalism in Kyiv. There, a mixed hybrid of Ukrainian and Russian “surzhyk” is spoken. My
sister understands surzhyk as can I. However, my sister who is 20 years old has difficulty
communicating in Russian, or understanding someone from Eastern Ukraine speaking Russian.”
~~~Sophia.
The Years Following Independence – The Kuchma Administration
At the time of independence, changes emerged and aided in developing the state.
Changes in economics, news media, education and other sectors continued gradually once
Kuchma became president. My participants saw Ukraine differently during Kuchma’s tenure.
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“The first years of independence, I was not interested in politics. My primary focus was
my studies. During this time, the local economy and businesses worked fairly well and changed
for the worst 10-15 years later. There was a split between citizens on the language issue. The
changes continued until Kuchma issued dictatorship. There was also a political party created,
named “Jedyna Ukrajina” (United Ukraine). With this party, you were forced to vote. They
dictated not only participation in the elections, but also how members were to vote.
Under Kuchma, newspapers and TV only reported on nice, positive events. These stories
were the kind that you would forget rather quickly. Simply put – they were show pieces. All
democratic reforms were bunched and silenced. Discussions on leading political and democratic
processes were kept silent.”
~~~Volodya.
“Voting for Kuchma’s second term was regulated – that is, dictating influences on the
electoral committee and the electoral process were present. With that, the fact that Symonenko
was a Communist – so above all, it did not sway anyone one way or the other. Though, it was
Kuchma who rode on this fact and used it to his advantage to earn more votes.”
~~~Petro.
“Nothing good came about. Kuchma wanted to stay in command and change the
Constitution.”
~~~Maksym.
“With reference to Kuchma – he in fact was in charge of Ukraine in 1992-1993 as Prime
Minister. With exclusive power to issue laws he was president from 1994-2005. It is worth
noting that during Kuchma’s leadership there were some negative moments: wild hording of
capital, in the 1990’s the general population becoming much poorer, the growth of lawlessness
and corruption, no definite direction in foreign policy. On the positive side: new constitution,
and creation of some foundation for basic laws, in the beginning of the 2000’s stabilization of the
economy, renewal of more normal pricing system of products and elimination of bartering, and
improvements of basic pay to workers.
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As to the issue of pricing and availability of products, I would say that the availability
improved; there were more products to choose from. However, the quality in general was not up
to par. Obviously, as soon as the very rich appeared – so did the good quality and the best
products. Unfortunately, most of the population lived and still lives in poverty – the earnings are
low and the prices are constantly increasing.
With reference to the political issues with Kuchma, in my opinion, the foreign policy was
undefined (non-directional). Moves were made in the direction of integration with the EU and at
the same time there was evidence and desire to collaborate and work closer with Russia and the
ex-Soviet Republics. The internal situation in the mid-2000’s was, by that time, different
oligarch classes were so organized that they had great influence on the economy as well as
political development. Consequently, there were conflicts amongst them, fighting over the
economy and the political life. The “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement was also a result of
this struggle. To put it more accurately, it was the way of fighting.”
~~~Viktor.
“Looking back on it, Kuchma was a terrible leader for Ukraine. He did not do a thing for
the state. He wasted time for the people, manipulated the instilled government system to suit
himself. Plus, he derailed advancement opportunities for Ukraine to strive for eventual
memberships to the WTO and EU in a timely manner, which was projected and promised. My
parents often discussed their hopes after independence. Their expectation was things would
change and improve in Ukraine with much fairness, speed and ease.”
~~~Sophia.
“The availability of goods and services are not to be credited to the Kuchma regime. The
end objective was international integration and globalization. Companies during this time, with
criminalistic capital had to put their money somewhere. The numerous migrant workers
(employees) then, also brought money into Ukraine, and built kiosks for small start up
businesses. The big businesses were not functional, so people sought alternative ways to make
money. For example, they worked abroad, exported goods to sell in other countries or imported
goods to sell in Ukraine, carried goods and sold them. During this time, some became parasites,
taking advantage of business people, racketeering organized crime.”
~~~Roman
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“Initially, when Kuchma became president, it appeared that opportunities for new growth
and the potential for grand life changes emerged. A sense of freedom opened up and became
more welcomed by people.”
~~~Maryna.
“During the Kuchma era, the educational system really changed and reforms came into
place. Standardized tests began to be implemented to help combat corruption in schools. It was
a way to enforce an even standard for equal opportunity in education. This was the biggest way
you could see de-politicization efforts and transition to democracy within the education sector of
society. Specialization degrees continued, but they became less popular. The higher educational
system changed to more of a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system. All of this was to fight for
the quality of education.
Montessori schools began. Pre-school is now for children between six months and six
years. Some 22,000 public secondary schools existed. Elementary schools have students from
first through fourth grades. These students must take a few standardized tests. Middle school
students – grades five through nine, are tested in five subjects – language, history, math, and
humanities (English, Business and Arts). High school students, grades ten and eleven, have
exams in history, math, language, science and one optional exam subject.”
~~~Mychajlo.
“During the times of the Soviet Union, Russian was taught in school and part of the
curriculum. Within a matter of a few years after independence, Russian was no longer a subject
taught in schools in Western Ukraine. It was totally eliminated from the curriculum. English
became a more popular subject in the classrooms. My niece teaches English in Pidhajtsi in the
grade school. She taught herself and now she’s sharing her self-taught knowledge to her
students. My niece often acknowledges that resources for both herself and her students are quite
limited. My children studied in the United States at universities. They have brought and sent
materials for their cousin to use as study aids and educational tools. They’ve also helped their
cousin with her own English skills, further helping her to better teach her young pupils.”
~~~Nadia.
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“Under Kuchma, more American iconic things entered into the Ukrainian market.
McDonald’s started opening more locations throughout Ukraine – the first location of the
restaurant was in Kyiv. At first, it was neat to get a taste of American lifestyle in Ukraine
through McDonald’s. However, it is very expensive. The cost of going out to eat at McDonald’s
nearly equals the cost of a dinner at a nice sit-down restaurant.
Again, anything that is iconic of America is expensive. I’ve seen Nike and Adidas
running shoes priced at $300 per pair in stores in Lviv. I was in the United States for the
summer of 2004. This was my first time in America. I walked in to TJ Maxx one day and saw
the same shoes I saw in Lviv, and they were priced at $40. I was shocked at the price variance.
In my opinion, I felt like the markups on American-associated goods, is like waving a carrot in
Ukrainian citizens’ faces. They way it came off was, “You know you want it, it is there and
available, but unattainable for most.””
~~~Bohdan.
“One thing that changed for me within my job after Kuchma took office was an increase
in travel abroad. I work as a chemical engineer and have been with the same company for many,
many years. I traveled occasionally throughout Ukraine and into Russia a couple times before
1991. After Kuchma became president, my travels have expanded to Germany and I still travel
somewhat regularly to Russia and throughout Ukraine checking on projects. I’d still like to see
more of the world, which is something I’ve always dreamed of doing, but the opportunity finally
came about during this era.”
~~~Roman.
“During the late 1990’s, I was finishing my university studies. While completing my
fifth year, my Master’s degree, I was also teaching English to the first year university students.
Throughout the academic year, I graded my students on their academic ability and how they
retained the information presented in class and in their homework. When year-end finals were
around the corner, some of my students (especially those who really had to work hard to earn a
passing grade), would start bringing me homemade tortes, cakes, desserts or other gifts. They
hoped the sweet treat would sweeten me to award them with good grades. This is something that
worked in years past for their parents when they were at university. I always appreciated the
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gesture, but also really tried not to let it influence me as I was administering their final exams
and grading them.”
~~~Mykola.
“I work with university students. My office is based in Kyiv, which I opened in 2000.
The fact that I was able to open my own business is something that would have been a greater
challenge some 20 years before – mainly because my business is a recruitment agency. We
recruit university students for a work and travel program to gain work experience in the United
States. We also run an Au Pair service for university students to nanny abroad. The fact that our
people have such an opportunity today is also a dream come true, as travel, back during the
Soviet era was accessible only within the states of the Soviet Union.
Many students view this program as a dream come true for their desire to travel and see
the world. When submitting their applications, many not only express interest in gaining work
experience and advancing their English, but also their desire to have the opportunity to travel
abroad and to see firsthand what life is like in the U.S.
Several of the students think or perceive that everyone in the U.S. lives a glamorous
lifestyle as seen on American TV shows broadcast in Ukraine. They think everyday life for all is
similar as seen on “Friends” or “Beverly Hills 90210.” They are fascinated by the life and
culture that exists in America and want that for themselves as well.
When the work and travel program’s popularity began in Ukraine back in the early
2000’s, students were able to stay and work in the U.S. for a full four months and as late into
October. However, university classes begin September 1 st. These students received an exception
as they were participating in the program but the stipulation remained they would need to return
home to Ukraine to continue their studies.”
~~~Danylo.
“Again, I’ve never had any interest or desire for politics. I’ve always tried to avoid the
topic, yet it emerges within my hobby. Under Kuchma, postage stamps were issued
commemorating Ukraine’s infrastructure of trains, sports, popular flowers, national holidays and
national poets. In the early 2000’s a sense of nationalism and patriotism began to be displayed in
the stamps. A series of stamps depicting traditional regional clothing, women’s headdresses,
swords, pysanky (Ukrainian Easter Eggs), churches and scenes of prominent tourist spots in
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major regional cities were depicted. Special stamps honoring national artists (for example, poets
Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko) were also issued and contained brief biographies. I suppose
it was a way to further instill national and cultural pride after independence. In all of these
stamps color came alive – bright, vibrant, detailed colors stood out on the stamps.”
~~~Taras.
“During Kuchma’s second term in office, I remember the students’ demonstrations
“Ukraine Without Kuchma” … I read a lot of periodic literary works about Stalin’s repressions,
Ukrainian history… Kuchma’s politics were bureaucracy and directed for self-survival.
Therefore, I would not call it democratic. However, in all actuality, political repression did not
exist… There was anti-regime movement. Even government workers openly discussed with
colleagues these events without fear of repercussions.”
~~~ Petro.
The 2004 Presidential Elections
As confirmed by my participants, to further develop the state during the early years of
independence, expectations within Ukraine under Kuchma’s command were high. This came
about as nationalistic pride continued to be promoted. The promised changes and anticipated
results to follow were not coming about. Instead, only cosmetic changes came and were used to
mask the stagnation of policies. Therefore, the desire for change in policies and procedures of
democratic nature still had not been attained at the end of Kuchma’s presidency. Many felt that
the presidential election of 2004 would serve as an opportunity to allow a turning point to
become a reality. To make this happen, people needed to participate in the elections.
“Towards the end of Kuchma’s time in office, my impressions were elevated and they
were expectations of what remained to be completed. I remember heated discussions with
colleagues and friends if they were supporting Yushchenko or Yanukovych. – Everyone’s
stances were quite strong either way. People were even able to pat each other on the back or
fight with one another, even if they knew each other for years… Despite this, people were not
afraid to express their opinions supporting Yushchenko even in Luhansk.
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Did I vote during the elections? Yes, of course I voted… Particularly, I remember how
strongly it was stressed the need to vote… We waited for some kind of provocation… There
was the potential of revenge in the future.”
~~~Petro.
“At first I thought that some of the oligarchs wanted to outlive the others. Not without
great costs of being sponsors, Kuchma’s propaganda worked well. They herded up students for
meetings supporting the Party of Regions and Yanukovych.
I participated in the elections by voting. I voted during all three rounds. I always feel
that need to participate in an election by voting, and you need to choose someone to support.”
~~~Volodya.
“Changes were wanted, not just desired. The belief was that the elections would be a
way to help change life for the better. I participated in the election. In other elections I also
participate. The tradition for us is this – participate in the elections.”
~~~Maksym.
“I most definitely participated in the election by voting. My younger sister also voted.
When the protests began after the first round of the election, she desperately wanted to travel to
Kyiv. I would not allow her to go alone, not knowing what could happen en route or upon
arrival. Though I wanted to travel to Kyiv myself, I knew that was potentially very unsafe due to
probable provocations that could come about. To make sure she did not travel during this time,
we hid her ID, so she could not make travel arrangements.”
~~~Mykola.
“In Lviv, we knew this was the time and great opportunity for change to occur. I
participated by voting. Some of my friends traveled to Kyiv, though.”
~~~Bohdan.
“In Ternopil, at the time of the election and its purpose was simple. The election was one
to determine who would be president – Yushchenko or Yanukovych – Kuchma’s chosen person
was to continue the ways of corruption. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko expressed what the
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people wanted to hear and expressed the changes that they as political figures and the general
public wanted to see in Ukraine.”
~~~Sophia.
“During the campaign, my friends and I often talked about the upcoming elections what
we saw and experienced within Lviv and Ternopil. All of us were in the middle of our university
studies. Several of my friends at other universities and their classmates were being bullied to
vote a certain way (in favor of Yanukovych). They were told if they did not vote for
Yanukovych, they would be evicted from student dormitories, face academic probations, or even
expulsion. To add to the threat of expulsion, authorities told students they would not be able to
transfer to another university in Ukraine after being expelled. Almost all of the universities in
Ukraine are run by the state; so, the fear of making these threats a reality was very possible.
Even professors and school teachers in smaller cities and villages were bullied like this
too. The threat they received if they did not vote “correctly” was to face unemployment.
Another friend of mine, who is a nurse at a small clinic, also was bullied into voting for
Yanukovych. Her punishment, like the school teachers, would be losing her job. Personally, I
tried to be very careful during this time. I focused hard on my studies and tried to keep to myself
and not get into serious discussions with anyone that somebody else might hear.”
~~~Maryna.
“During the 2004 elections, Yushchenko campaign billboards in and around Pidhajtsi
were vandalized at night. Sometimes they were vandalized in broad daylight. They were openly
destroyed even with guards protecting the boards after the act became quite regular. The proYushchenko boards were replaced with posters expressing support for Yanukovych. Campaign
posters for both candidates decorated tall fences, buildings and such, wherever there was space,
making it look like wallpaper. You could see the mix of Yanukovych posters overlapping and
trying to cover Yushchenko posters. You would not dare take down the Yanukovych posters
once they were up. They were all closely monitored, surveyed and protected by the authorities.
This was not just in Pidhajtsi or in the Ternopil oblast, where Yushchenko was incredibly
popular, but it happened throughout Western Ukraine. Western Ukraine heavily supported
Yushchenko and what he stood for, what he wanted for us and for Ukraine.”
~~~Nadia.
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“I believe the pre-election expectations were for changes for the better. Part of the
population put their expectations in support of Yushchenko and part in Yanukovych.
Unfortunately, the majority of the population believes in the promises the politicians make, and
pay little attention to what they have done. That was before the elections.
When the election started, a lot of people were angered by the way the election was
handled. Many infractions and falsifications were allowed by the authorities because they tried
to push Yanukovych into the presidency. The hopes and expectations, coupled with the anger
for the falsifications during voting, the trust in the politicians who promised better life in case of
Yushchenko’s victory, caused the people to invade Maidan in Kyiv – the demonstration.
My personal impression before the election was virtually unemotional. I did not believe
any of the promises made by Yanukovych, nor Yushchenko, or his supporter – Yulia
Tymoshenko. I knew that these people did not care much for Ukraine and perhaps did not even
understand the meaning of the presidency and the responsibility that goes with it. I was leaning
to support Yushchenko only because he represented smaller and less influential oligarchs.
Furthermore, Yanukovych, we knew, in his youth was involved in criminal activities according
to court records. Yushchenko, on the other hand, had a clean record. I would not care to look
for a national patriot amongst all the politicians. I did participate in the elections, as I always
went voting in the past. This is only because I feel it’s my duty.”
~~~Viktor.
The Orange Revolution
Many citizens understood the value and need to participate in the elections by voting as
indicated by my participants’ experiences. Also, was the need to respond to Yushchenko’s call
to action, requesting that everyone who could, come on to Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Many, who
could travel to Kyiv, did. Some traveled with ease and others with great difficulty, as authorities
were directed to send travelers from other cities back to their hometowns.
“I was in Western Ukraine at the time of the 2004 elections. I was near Ternopil. We all
saw and realized what was going on in the larger cities with the election. About three or four
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days after the second round of voting, I decided to go to Kyiv. I took the local shuttle bus 40km
from Berezhany to Ternopil without any difficulty.
In Ternopil, I decided to take the bus to Lviv and once there, purchase a train ticket to
Kyiv. This was more cost-efficient and the schedule was more flexible than trying to take the
train from Ternopil to Kyiv. As soon as I arrived to the train station in Lviv, the ticket agent
informed me that all train tickets to Kyiv were sold out. The ticket agent also said that there
would not be any more trains traveling to Kyiv. I was not going to let this stop me. I wanted to
be part of this event. I wanted to be part of history. I knew all of this would be part of a great
story I would tell not only my children, but also my grandchildren, some day.
I went back to the bus station and bought a ticket. Going to Kyiv by bus would, of
course, take longer than train, which I was ok with as I knew I had no other real viable option.
Shortly after we were on the road, somewhere just outside of Lviv, the authorities had blocked
the road. A couple of police officers got on the bus and informed us that the bus had to be turned
around. They were not allowing any travel to Kyiv whatsoever. The bus was full of passengers.
We were all shocked, disgusted and angered by what had happened.”
~~~Vasyl.
“I was studying at the university when the elections took place. It was the end of
November and I had exams I needed to prepare for, so I decided to stay in Lviv. My friends,
however, decided to go to Kyiv. Within about a day, they quickly organized themselves to travel
in groups to Kyiv. Once there, they planned to take turns standing out in the cold on Maidan.
This way, not everyone would stand outside in the cold at the same time and get exhausted and
not withstand the cold elements for excessive amounts of time. They could also alternate their
time and travel between Kyiv and Lviv, while still taking care of everyday matters at home. I
helped my friends to take care of things while they were away; including visiting their homes as
someone would when watching a house while you are away on vacation. My friends all came
back with their impressions of the atmosphere on Maidan.
They also told me about the challenges they faced while traveling between Lviv and
Kyiv. It was interesting that whenever the group who was in Kyiv and ready to go back after a
couple days, they had minimal problems traveling. They had the most issues when they first
attempted to go to Kyiv. I think their returning to Lviv during the protests actually helped them.
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They made the authorities think for just a moment that the best thing would be was to return
home and continue with everyday life activities. They made it look like they were not actively
participating in the protests.”
~~~Bohdan.
“During the Orange Revolution, I was in the Czech Republic on business. Abroad and
especially in the U.S.A., these events are viewed from a romantic perspective. Ukrainians see it
differently. My friends from Western Ukraine expressed doubts during the Orange Revolution
and disappointments thereafter.
During the revolution the public was awakened. Some had expectations, some had fear
of worrying and some just tried to guess what will come out of all this. In general, there was
uplift – people felt they could challenge the authorities. This can be good and it can be bad. It
all depends on what direction that energy is aimed at.”
~~~Viktor.
“I was concerned during this time. I was very nervous about telling others who I voted
for, who I supported during the campaign and who’s platform would best benefit me as a citizen.
My hesitation to talk about who I voted for came from the provocations and bullying my friends
experienced at their universities. It wasn’t until several days into the Orange Revolution that I
started opening up and telling people that I in fact voted for Yushchenko. Still, I was extremely
cautious to share this information with my peers, even those who also supported Yushchenko.”
~~~Maryna.
“Some of my friends traveled to Maidan to participate in the protest. I called them from
time to time for updates. During this time, I was in Ternopil on a previously arranged trip. I
watched the happenings on Maidan on TV.”
~~~Petro.
“I vividly remember Maidan! Living in Kyiv, I knew I had to go and participate. I met a
lot of people, some from Kyiv and others who traveled great distances to participate. Some of
the conversations I had with others were quite open, in depth and others; just simply wanted to
be a part of the event, kept their conversations with me very brief. From the people I spoke with,
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many from Western and Central Ukraine, seemed organized with their travel groups – they were
well prepared to face the winter weather with many warm clothes and blankets, food and phone
chargers. Whenever anyone had a chance to walk through the underground shopping area under
Maidan, you would see outlets overflowing with mobile phones charging up and some people
were also using their laptops. The ones from Eastern Ukraine seemed to be less organized and
ill-prepared, with just the clothes on their backs.
Standing among the crowds, I started talking with a couple of young guys from Eastern
Ukraine who were from Dnipropetrovs’k. I asked why they came and how was it that they
seemed to have virtually nothing with them. One quickly answered that they were sent to
Maidan just to see what exactly was going on. They were strong Yanukovych supporters, and
the local Yanukovych campaign office sent them to Kyiv to counter-protest. They were simply
overwhelmed and mesmerized by the events and what they were seeing. They quickly realized
there was no way they could complete the job assigned to them. The young men confided in me
that they too wanted to be a part of the event, but they were unsure of their real role. The young
men told me that just before stepping on to Maidan they threw away pro-Yanukovych, antiYushchenko signs they brought into the trash. They wanted to be a part of the events on Maidan
in a positive way, not to fight for the continuation of what existed until that point.
I offered them what I could – warm food, a chance to stop into my apartment to warm up
and freshen up, call their families. The gentlemen said they received an outpouring of support
from local Kyivans and those who came prepared to stay outside for long periods of time.
People shared their blankets, gave them cups of hot tea and soups. They told me they were
overwhelmed by the warm reception from so many; as when they arrived, they anticipated that
everyone would express animosity towards them as they were originally sent to fight against the
intent of what was happening on Maidan.
See, the protests on Maidan were a way to unite us. They reminded us that we are all
human and we were in this together.”
~~~Roman.
Technology and The Orange Revolution
During the Orange Revolution, regardless of my participants’ locations, all relied on
technology for communication. The most reliable form of technology was telephone – both cell
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phone and land line. Those who had and used cell phones often checked in with others via
SMS/text messages. Internet communications via ICQ and emails were quite popular with all
participants. Everyone who said they utilized these media found it a positive way to document
their immediate feelings and the events in their surroundings. None of my participants really
mentioned anything regarding blogs – if they read other blogs or if they personally blogged
during this time. They all accessed news websites to get the most up to date information on the
happenings around them and throughout Ukraine. Many watched the events on TV.
“I remember the excitement being broadcast on TV from Maidan. That was the central
place for all activity. All I watched on TV during that time were the events and activities on
Maidan in Kyiv.”
~~~Maksym.
“Politics have never seriously interested me. I did not travel to Kyiv. It was interesting
to observe the events on TV and radio, however.”
~~~Volodya.
“The most important moment was the fact that the government did not order any
shooting, and did not put the tanks on the streets, that it did not start a war.”
~~~Viktor.
Outcomes and Results
Viktor noted directly the fear and concern that bloodshed would occur. The fear of
internal war potentially starting within the state was a strong concern with the high stress and
tension surrounding the discourse of the announced outcome of the election. Many of my
interview participants alluded to this point. However, they never came out directly to recall this
concern. In addition to asking my participants about where they were at the time of the election,
how they participated, what modes of communication they utilized, I also asked them what they
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most vividly recalled from this time. Some said the particular events they personally
experienced; and others, the conversations they had with virtual strangers. No one referenced the
musical entertainment on Maidan that continued throughout the movement. I also asked what
the most ideal outcome would be. For Viktor, the most positive outcome was the fact that
bloodshed did not occur. Hopeful outcomes greatly varied for others who shared their
experiences.
“My impressions and feelings were not very happy, nor optimistic about any good results
after these elections. Within my family and friends, some were cautious to take any position in
the elections. Some felt sorry for this or the other candidate. I did not hear anyone expressing
any trust for either candidate. The biggest dissatisfactions were the falsifications. The people
would not accept that. It was taken as theft of their rights. In my opinion, that was the basis of
this so called “Orange Revolution.” To call what happened a revolution is an over assumption.
Was it manifestation of public consciousness? – Yes! Even though, later that too, was
squandered away.
There were not many great expectations. Of course the desire for economic stability,
reduction in corruption (or hopefully, total elimination), hope for more stable and better laws –
not the kind being written for the convenience of certain groups or individuals, since
independence.”
~~~Viktor.
“The hope was for growth and opportunities not just for Ukraine, but for the people.
Hope existed for European integration, and EU membership. The eventual result from these
things would be more opportunities for people to travel abroad and not just travel abroad to find
work, but more for leisure, business purposes and such exchanges. Many still want to travel
abroad, mainly for the purpose to find employment. Several of my friends will go to the Polish
Consulate in Lviv and wait in line for a full day in hopes to obtain a work visa. They know there
are many possible opportunities there for employment.”
~~~Sophia.

51
“A couple things went through my mind during this time while going through the events
of the Orange Revolution. Truly, I remember very well the broadcasts from Maidan on Radio
Era, TV Channel 5. The feeling of joy during the announcement of the re-vote’s results of
Yushchenko’s victory…. Unimaginable hatred and fear in the eyes of some leaders who so
strongly supported Yanukovych. Ultimately, my hope during this time was the creation of a true,
righteous, real Ukrainian lawful state and with equal partnership with Europe while stepping
away from Russia. Measurable improvement in the economy – for instance to do like the Czech
Republic, and the Baltics – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, was also expected.”
~~~Petro.
“I hoped for less fear of needing others in order to accomplish something for myself and
needing to repay the person or people who expected a favor in return. Really, I wanted to feel
more like one large team, working together. All citizens and government officials working
toward a common goal to fully better Ukraine is what I envisioned would happen. A sense of
that was noticeable during the Orange Revolution even with the tense moments.”
~~~Maryna.
“I hoped for European integration, quality of life to be improved for people, finally,
renewal of authority.”
~~~Volodya.
“It’s simple – improvement of life, reforms, democratic elections.”
~~~Maksym.
“I hoped the result of the elections would improve my life and the lives of my family and
close friends. I hoped for all of us to have more opportunities and to a certain extent, an easier
life, with fewer daily struggles.”
~~~Mykola.
“I hoped the results would lead to a much happier life for everyone. While walking on
the streets of Lviv, or any other city in Ukraine, you rarely, if ever, see people smile. Their eyes
are lifeless. People’s eyes sparkle when hope and possibility are present. You do not see or feel
this in Lviv. I never have felt this here. I see it with Americans when they visit, their eyes
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sparkle, even when they are not smiling. You can actually see the hope, possibility and
positivity of wonder that is around them.”
~~~Bohdan.
“I was hopeful for more opportunities for personal growth. That is, I was looking
forward to the grand possibilities of experiencing life abroad. I expected that it would be easier
to travel to and from Ukraine. Fortunately, I had this opportunity; to travel abroad. Though, I
am not sure if this opportunity was an actual result of the Orange Revolution, as some travel was
possible before the election and the Revolution.”
~~~Sophia.
“Personally, I was very hopeful that the ultimate result of the Orange Revolution would
be quite positive. I was very optimistic that it would greatly benefit my company and allow
citizens a better chance to travel abroad and experience life overseas. I also hoped that many
would take their experiences and apply them to our own economy and workforce. The potential
is there to really improve our employment systems here with this new knowledge. The desire for
seeing the world who watched us was high. Some of my students said they found the Orange
Revolution to be a personal eye opener as they learned that people around the world were
following the events.”
~~~Danylo.
“Many people were hoping for a better life. Everyone was under the auspicious of
corruption and family ties. Some businesses now, today attempt and make an effort to meet
European standards.”
~~~Volodya.
Expectations After the Orange Revolution
Collectively, these were the hopes and sentiments my participants – as well as their
families, friends and colleagues – experienced during the Orange Revolution. All participants
said there was a sense of calm that emerged after the Orange Revolution, especially since there
was also concern that a potentially highly stressful time could possibly erupt into an
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uncontrollable situation. It was after Yushchenko took office that reality set in. This was the
time for the reforms that were promised were to be executed. Yet, the promised changes were
not seen or being noticed. This general observation made by the public as well as scholars and
analysts. With the observed changes, expectations also changed.
“Changes were realized when the real reforms didn’t have the strength or power to be
implemented to make them a reality when the president forfeited his authority when he realized
there would be no illusions and the same leaders remained in their positions. The illusions of
patriotic governing and growth (uplifting of nationally oriented economy), instead was present.”
~~~Petro.
“We expected and felt a breath of fresh air. The chance to go back to a democratic way
within life and policies to be restored was present. It sounded like the changes would go into
effect immediately. That was not the case. We waited. We waited some more. Nothing ever
really happened.”
~~~Bohdan.
“Gradually, things were, or became clear, that the new leadership that came in was no
less corrupt than the oligarchs, but were poorer. Some of the new leaders were in utopia, far
from reality. It was like this until Yanukovych became prime minister.”
~~~Volodya.
“I anxiously waited for the promised changes to occur. I was hopeful for several months.
I would wake up in the morning and think to myself, ‘Today will be the day. We will see
changes – something will be announced in the news.’ It did not happen. I started to question my
own sanity for my anxiousness at the time of the Orange Revolution. Did I really make that
sacrifice to travel? Did it help in the long run of my daily life? I was part of the initial event to
get the changes to start. Just, the changes did not happen.”
~~~Vasyl.
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“Changes came about when those who won the election did not fulfill their promises.
They became friends with those who the public voted against. All that was desired by many was
the return to democracy.”
~~~Maksym.
“I would say that after the Revolution, many people were disappointed. Actually,
nothing had changed at all. The fighting in the government, economic instability, closing of
many banks, due to bankruptcy, and people’s losses of savings created a new vicious cycle. The
conflicts between the president and the prime minister, the president and the parliament, the
attempt of the president to butt into the judicial system, ignoring of campaign promises, no
enforcement of law, the growth in the size of the government, and again the corruption, which
everyone is fighting.”
~~~Viktor.
“Personally, my life has not changed much, that is, the quality of life. I’ve always lived
fairly simply, like many in and around Pidhajtsi. Parts of the smaller villages surrounding my
small town still have limited electricity, just as they did 30 years ago. Some residents don’t even
have telephones in their homes or the phone lines do not reach their areas of the villages still
today. In general, I expected that some of these things would have improved by now, knowing
that technology is around us and we all rely on it to a certain extent daily. At the very least, I
expected that there would be consistent electricity throughout the neighboring villages by today.
There are also many very large and potentially dangerous potholes in the streets and
roads. The potholes are always ignored, never repaired, and continue to grow with each season
and changes in the weather, like anywhere else. Some of the potholes are as big as the road is
wide and they get worse each year. The infrastructure just is not executed locally (that is within
the Ternopil Oblast) to give us the attention we need. Other things are more important.”
~~~Nadia.
“A sense of nationalism and patriotism emerged in the postage stamps about the time of
the Orange Revolution and the first few months after. Stamps commemorating the Orange
Revolution were issued honoring the most recent event in Ukraine.”
~~~Taras.
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Were There Any Changes in Life After the Orange Revolution?
After the Orange Revolution, all of my participants had expectations of what life would
be like under the new administration. In addition to sharing their expectations, my participants
also discussed if and how their lives have changed since the Orange Revolution.
“Presently, life has worsened. In comparison to the U.S. Dollar, you earn two times less
for the same job, because the price of goods and services has increased greatly. I do not feel that
the politics are nationally oriented. Mostly, the greater demographic of “grabbers” (leadership)
do not indicate any signs of improvement or potential for changes. The opposition is
demoralized. People are tired of the politics. They do not believe the politicians. Besides that,
economic bad news, and huge price increases for communal services and products are greatly
worsening the situation.”
~~~Petro.
“Life worsened. The quality of it deteriorated. Hope was lost. My life has not changed
one bit.”
~~~Maksym.
“Right now, life has worsened. This is because now educators are earning very low
wages and they have not increased in quite some time. Communal expenses and cost of food
(overall cost of living) has increased and it appears it will continue to increase. Anything you
need to ask for, anything you need resolution for, you need to pay bribes. There is no law
against it. It seems that the laws are in existence not for the protection of anyone, but to have the
ability to accuse the innocent, or punish the innocent and protect the guilty (all for the sake of
bribes).
Since the Orange Revolution, my life has barely changed. In certain areas, it is
impossible to make any moves that will provide resolution. City rulers are leading by the old
schemes. One who has access to your body, also controls your mind.”
~~~Volodya.
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“In my opinion, the events on Maidan in 2004 were not exactly a revolution. A
revolution is a change in socio-political and economic order that occurred in 1991. In 2004, one
group of oligarchs took control and pushed the other one aside. In fact, after these events,
nothing changed. The only item of interest was to follow the infighting in the “Orange Camp”
and the efforts of the opposition to out argue and out shout those in power. Now the situation in
Ukraine truly has changed. It changed, but not for the better.
The events of 2004, which you call a revolution, did not affect a change in my life or
lives of most people. The changes occurred after that in 2010 and even moreso in 2011.”
~~~Viktor.
“My life has not changed as a result of the election’s outcome. Things remain the same.
Within a year of the Orange Revolution, I needed minor surgery which still required anesthesia.
My doctor referred me to a surgeon for the procedure. The surgeon told me he could perform the
necessary surgery as long as I paid him upfront. The payment was to guarantee that the correct
procedure would be done and completed properly. My upfront payment did not cover any sort of
legitimate medical costs like the time for the surgery, necessary tools and so forth.
In addition to paying the surgeon, I also had to pay the anesthesiologist well in advance
of the surgery. This payment was to ensure he administered the proper dosage of anesthesia so
as for me not feel the pain, but also for him not to kill me. The bribes I had to pay before the
surgery did not stop there. I also had to pay the pharmacist to fill the prescription for antibiotics
and any pain medications my surgeon prescribed. The payment was to ensure that the proper
doses were given to me as set by my doctor. The additional costs about doubled the actual
necessary cost of the procedure. I had no choice but to pay the bribes to have the surgery and
have it done correctly.”
~~~Bohdan.
“I’m still extremely cautious in my everyday life. I confide in my closest friends my
opinions, especially relating to politics. Telling the wrong person the right thing can get you in
trouble. It can also make life very difficult for yourself. Survival of the fittest exists.”
~~~Maryna.
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“My life, as I said before, really has not changed much at all during these years and
especially after the Orange Revolution. A couple years ago, a cousin of ours made plans to come
to Ukraine for a visit for a family event in the village. My relative brought a suitcase on the
plane, but it never made it to the baggage claim area in Lviv. The airport authorities promised to
track down the luggage and call us once it arrived. We checked in with the airport for couple of
days and got the same response that the bag was still lost.
A friend of a friend of my family’s knew one of the guards at the Lviv airport who
relayed the story of the missing suitcase. The guard confirmed the bag in fact made it off the
plane with my cousin. The friend and guard made an agreement and arranged to return the bag.
The arrangement included a bunch of pages of jokes printed from the internet, a bottle of cognac
and a box of chocolates.
On our way back to the village, my relative told me of the interrogation regarding the
bag’s contents. The interrogation was conducted while signing the paperwork for collecting the
suitcase. The bag was returned with a wire wrapped around it, through the zipper and soldered
shut. The bag was searched for any possible items of value or importance.”
~~~Nadia.
“A colleague of mine was crossing the street in Kyiv. He was jay-walking and the police
officers caught him. The policemen were going to issue the man a ticket, fining him for the
offense which was about $5 U.S. Dollars. However, they started negotiating with my colleague.
They told him if he gave them $10 – double the charge of the ticket, they would not write or
issue the ticket let alone document the happening.”
~~~Roman.
“Those changes I wanted to see and rushed to Kyiv and Maidan to show my support
during the Orange Revolution did not happen. My life has not improved. At best, it remains the
same – this is my optimism speaking. To be negative, life has worsened because changes have
not occurred to improve the overall quality of life for all. Politics remains the same.”
~~~Vasyl.
“Things have not changed a whole lot. One thing I have noticed is that you hear a little
more Ukrainian spoken on the streets of Kyiv. You do not hear it very often and you have to
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listen very carefully. It is still a hybrid-mix of Ukrainian and Russian. If you start speaking to
someone in Ukrainian in Kyiv, some will be more inclined today than they were ten years ago to
respond to you in Ukrainian. I’ve noticed this whenever I would come to Kyiv to visit my sister
and compared this to my earlier travels before she was at university.”
~~~Sophia.
“The program that I run really is a very good experience for our university-aged students.
They are able to gain great work experience, practice English and see a part of the world. I think
the work experience is the greatest benefit to the students. This is something they would not
have a chance to obtain at the same level if they applied for an entry-level job here in Ukraine.
The economy just is not strong enough for them at this level. This is a challenge that has not yet
been met. My students also have acknowledged this when they express interest in participating
in the program. In turn, they can apply their new skills to a job here when seeking employment.
Working abroad is very attractive to employers here.
In preparation for their visa interviews, my students also meet with me to assess their
language skills, determine if the student is not only qualified, but is sincerely interested in
participating in the program. The students applying to the program for the first time, I get a very
good feeling about their intentions. It is the students who want to participate for a second or
third time on the program who concern me.
The students participating in the program for the first time are concerned to abide by the
set rules and ramifications. These guidelines are established by the consulate to ensure students
return home in time for their university classes. The “first time” students also tend to follow the
rules closely, as they understand that any faulty steps they take could jeopardize the possibility of
obtaining a visa to the U.S. in the future.
I mentioned before the students who return to participate in the program raise concern for
me. Primarily, my concern is that they will challenge the rules and regulations by not returning
home once they completed their programs. A lot of this is because these returning students have
already been to the U.S. and feel comfortable traveling abroad. They already know and have a
strong understanding of the procedures to participate. Plus, these students already have
connections and networks in the U.S. as a result of their previous trip. Some of the students
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maintain these new connections along with ties to old friends and distant relatives so they can
stay “a couple extra weeks before coming home.”
The most concerning students are the ones who completed their fourth year of university
studies, the equivalent of their Bachelor’s degree. I’ve seen many students who, after
completing their fourth year of university not return home. I call the students’ family when I
learn they have not come back. Often, the parents do not seem concerned that their child has not
returned home. The rule is that the students must return home in a reasonable timeframe for their
university studies. The students all see opportunity available to them to work in America, and
they also see the challenges and slow development of life improvement here in Ukraine.
One of the ways I’ve seen the program change since the Orange Revolution is the length
of the visa for our students. A couple years before the Orange Revolution, around 2003-2004,
Ukrainian students could participate on their work programs in America until October.
University classes begin September 1st. Many students saw this program as a luxury and never
returned home. The freedom was abused and the consulate started requiring all Ukrainian
students to return home in time for their university classes. The expected return date continues
to push earlier into August each year. Four years ago, in 2007, students had to return home by
September 2nd. In 2008, students had to return by August 31st. Last year, in 2010, they had to
return by August 28th.
It is in these ways I see what has changed in Ukraine. Traveling abroad has been less
restrictive than it was 25 years ago. My company has had a great chance to grow because of the
greater freedom for international travel.”
~~~Danylo.
“Personally, my life has not changed. However, I have noticed that my hobby and
passion has. Fewer stamps have been issued in the last couple of years. They are less ornate and
much less nationalistic. They lack the cultural pride which influenced the stamps’ previous
designs just a few years ago. The stamps are more industrial. They focus on military ships and
the most popular train lines in Ukraine. I asked someone at the post office about their
observations about the stamps after noticing this change. They blamed the change in motifs due
to the economy and the cost of printing such stamps was an unnecessary expense, where funds
could be used in other ways.”
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~~~Taras.
“Yanukovych and his supporters recently capitalized on this lack of improvement in life.
When he ran against Yushchenko in the presidential election a couple years ago, many of his key
supporters canvassing for him hit the small villages in Western Ukraine quite hard. They saw
these people going through hardships and many lacked funds to take care of everyday matters.
They literally capitalized on this. Yanukovych’s supporters talked with these people and offered
them bribes if they voted for Yanukovych. They offered some people as much as 3,000-5,000
hryvnia. For some, this is massive amounts of money. They promised that with Yanukovych as
president, life would be grand and wonderful. They painted a beautiful image of the life they
could have if Yanukovych was elected president. Many villagers accepted this bribe as they
needed the cash.”
~~~Mychajlo.
Patriotism and Nationalism
From my participants’ feedback one can deduce that life has not changed immensely
since the Orange Revolution. If anything, the quality of life is about the same it was the
movement, or slightly worse. They’ve acknowledged slight changes in daily life on a grander
scale. However, they have not experienced many differences which immediately and directly
affect their lives. My participants’ responses led me to ask about their patriotism and at what
point did they feel most patriotic or nationalistic in their lives.
“I believe I am more patriotic now than I was ever before. Even with that strong of a
conviction, I would not be defending it as energetically. In places, the world has a lot of grey,
because the world is not just black and white.”
~~~Petro.
“My patriotism started in the 1980’s. It continues today. It remains at the same level
today as it did during the 1980’s.”
~~~Volodya.
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“Many times; during various events and times when it was necessary to defend what I
believed in.”
~~~Maksym.
“Hearing Ukraine’s national anthem play on Maidan during the Orange Revolution was
when I felt most patriotic. It was played and sung daily on Maidan. This reiterated my
patriotism. It was truly reinforced and moved me greatly – to the point of tears. This was
particularly moving after the third round of voting. To acknowledge Yushchenko’s election and
those standing out on Maidan supporting him, the anthem was played yet again. I never felt
more Ukrainian in my life or knew what it meant to be Ukrainian until that moment.”
~~~Roman.
“I think I am as patriotic as I was before. My nationalistic pride really came out during
the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko stood for the things I believed in, wanted
and hoped for. They took their positions, expressed what many of us wanted – democracy,
openness, and development.”
~~~Mykola.
“My nationalism or patriotism never really existed. I consider all of this part of politics.”
~~~Taras.
“During the last ten years, I’ve proudly displayed a Ukrainian flag on the wall in my
home. Many of my friends do the same. Some just display their Ukrainian flag at the time of
“patriotic” holidays. They will display their flag to celebrate Independence Day of 1991 and also
from 1918. They may also pull out their flag in November when honoring and remembering the
millions who perished during the Holodmor. I prefer to keep my Ukrainian flag displayed all
year long. It reminds me who I am and where I live.”
~~~Bohdan.
“I have always been patriotic. My attitude to my Fatherland fortunately was not affected
by the reconstruction (Perestroika), Kuchma, Yushchenko with Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or
the Orange Revolution. I am Ukrainian, grew up in Ukraine, my grandparents and great-
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grandparents lived here. I know the history of my country, the culture and the language. I love
Ukraine dearly and I strive to do what is the best for the people.”
~~~Viktor.
“I would say I’m still very patriotic. My patriotism really started in 1991. During
Kuchma’s time as president, my patriotism subsided, especially during the Gongadze scandal. I
questioned the legitimacy of the news reports. This made me question my own nationalistic
pride. It wasn’t until Yushchenko started campaigning and traveling throughout Ukraine that my
patriotism returned with new energy, passion and excitement. I think it subsided again during
the Yushchenko administration when changes were not happening. My own patriotism really
declined at the same rate that Yushchenko’s popularity did during his presidency.”
~~~Vasyl.
“During the Orange Revolution was when I felt most patriotic. I was at university and
once the Orange Revolution started and it felt “ok” to express my nationalism more than the
months before, I did it. The expression was liberating.”
~~~Maryna.
“My most nationalistic moment was voting in the election during all three rounds. The
results of the third round put a huge smile on my face. I felt like I helped, I did my part to
support Yushchenko in a way I could. In the third round, my vote actually meant something! I
felt my patriotism within me was quite strong then and hope came for me that my patriotism
would grow with Ukraine.”
~~~Sophia.
In the Future…
In conclusion, after learning about the level of nationalism and patriotism my participants
expressed, I had to ask a question about the future. I asked, if a future event resembling the
Orange Revolution, or an event calling on the public’s participation, were to occur again, would
people follow through on the request to respond?
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“In public encounters – no. I cannot do this publically because of my current position
and status within society. However, in fact, in voting and referendums and other opportunities of
expression of my faith, I would participate in such an event again – absolutely.”
~~~Petro.
“I would be more inclined to participate in a greater fashion. I think that many others
would also participate.”
~~~Volodya.
“No. I no longer believe in politicians or revolutions.”
~~~Maksym.
“Definitely. Despite the challenges I faced during my travels to Kyiv, I would do it all
again. Instead of going alone, I would bring a group of people with me on such an adventure.
This strength in numbers would also further challenge the authorities along the way.”
~~~Vasyl.
“Absolutely! If I needed to open my home to others, as I extended last time, I would do
it in an instant. I love meeting new people, learning from them and discussing our viewpoints.
This is what makes all of us stronger – more united as citizens.”
~~~Roman.
“I’m not sure. If I knew my life would not be affected because I would support one or
the other person, maybe. That is, I would not risk losing my job, my home, not face any charges
because of my viewpoint and how I see things.”
~~~Maryna.
“Should something similar were to occur, I would have to see. If again, someone was
counting on the patriotic convictions of the public, tried to secure himself a nice, warm position
in the government, I will not participate in that. However, if on the scene appeared people who
truly will care for Ukraine and the people, for the culture and sovereignty; then, yes, I will work
and support them. How could I not?”
~~~Viktor.
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“I can see myself participating in the future. I’m not sure in what capacity. At the very
least, I would vote, express my opinion, be vocal. At this point in my life, spending numerous
hours outside in street protests would be very stressful and take a serious toll on my health.”
~~~Nadia.
“If I were to participate, I might want to do more than just vote. It all depends on where I
am in my life, and what happened to instigate the protest.”
~~~Sophia.
“I would participate in an event like this again. It was an exciting, yet stressful and nerve
wracking time. As we all went through this once, I think it would be different a second time
around. We’ve gone through all of it once. I can see myself taking on a leadership or
coordinator role on a local level in my town.”
~~~Mykola.

ANALYSIS OF ORAL HISTORIES
All together, through my participants’ personal experiences, it is evident that over the
course of the last 30 to 40 years, life in Ukraine has changed overall. Changes to a democratic
system from socialism and the way government functioned have affected Ukraine on a grander
level. Despite the changes, people’s lives have not been revolutionized. One of my participants
left me with some closing thoughts:
“Do not think of me as a pessimist, but rather a realist. I believe that Ukraine and the
Ukrainian people will not get lost in the dust of history. For thousands of years, people in our
land developed great culture, built beautiful palaces, grew bread and wrote songs. Attempts for
many ages to destroy these people attained no success. We survived and will continue to
survive. The current events – they are ‘growth of illness,’ therefore; we should forgive our
leaders, because they know not what they are doing.”
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With the changes observed by my participants and their personal experiences, it is
evident to see how the 2004 election and the Orange Revolution played out for them. Their
observations and recollections help reinforce the fact that the Orange Revolution was a postsocialist urban political movement. They painted the picture of life during Soviet times, the
initial excitement of independence and the pangs and challenges that followed. My participants’
experiences during the Orange Revolution and their feelings before and after, compliment the
definition of urban social movements. These firsthand accounts provide additional depth to this
topic while further describing the circumstances of this time. The participants’ experiences
expand the criteria of post-socialist urban political movements by providing specific examples.

The 2004 Presidential Elections
One very common point of view among my participants was the personal value and
importance they felt when casting their vote. All stressed this basic act of participation. Also
commonly, my participants shared what the election meant in their eyes, the expectations,
concerns and anxiety that followed, the bullying that occurred, as well as the sense of division.

 Meaning of the Election
With the common sentiment that participation in the election by voting was important,
the election held meaning to citizens. Several participants stated they hoped the election would
bring about great things, especially the possibility for changes. Maksym strongly felt this way.
Both Volodya and Sophia felt the election was an opportunity for one of two possible options to
emerge. They felt there was potential for the better of two evils to be elected. It would either by
the oligarchs led by Kuchma who would stay in command and things within Ukraine would
remain unchanged; or the possibility for change could come with Yushchenko’s election. Viktor
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also noticed this, but was pessimistic about the end result. Sophia saw hope within the elections.
She noted Yushchenko and Tymoshenko spoke directly to the citizens, focusing on the issues
that were important to them. Nadia observed strong support for Yushchenko in Pidhajtsi.

 Anxiety, Concern and Expectations
Within the election, expectations were set. Anxiety and concern followed, if the
expectations were not met. Petro felt the election was an opportune time to finish the expected
changes that were not yet complete. His concerns stemmed from possible provocations. Petro
felt the need to be on guard. Like Petro, Mykola was also concerned about possible
provocations.
Sophia was concerned about the possibility of corruption continuing after the election.
Nadia noticed the vandalism of billboards which were monitored after Yanukovych posters came
up. A sense of uncertainty was indirect once authorities protected campaign signs.
Maryna was very concerned during the time before and during the elections. She was
nearly fearful. Her own anxiety emerged while cautiously confiding in others about the pending
elections. Maksym blatantly acknowledged that changes were needed, not only desired. Bohdan
felt the election was a solid opportunity for initially expected changes to come about.

 Bullying
In addition to the anxiety and concern people felt, bulling was a tactic that enhanced these
feelings. Viktor said the bullying furthered after the fear was instilled in citizens. Nadia noticed
the bullying by means of destroying pro-Yushchenko billboards and replacing them with proYanukovych posters. The authorities then monitored the signs to prevent further destruction.
Maryna provided the greatest details of the bullying that existed which she and her friends
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experienced. She noted the posed consequences and how they potentially could change a
person’s life during their university studies or career.

 Division
With the election pending, the possibility for division came about. Petro talked about
heated discussions he had with his friends and colleagues. Some conversations were quite
intense. Viktor also felt impending divisions based on people’s preferences for who would be
elected. Nadia felt the divisions through the billboards’ destruction, replacement and protection.
Finally, Maryna felt the divisions develop via bullying she heard of and witnessed.

Orange Revolution
In discussing the Orange Revolution, my participants described issues surrounding
transportation, weather conditions, secrets and confidentiality, anxiety and concern, as well as
elements of sharing and teamwork. Their references to this event, confirm it was an urban
movement.

 Transportation
From the testimonies, people traveled to Kyiv from all over Ukraine. A few of my
participants had friends who traveled from their small town or city to Kyiv. Petro was in
Ternopil on a trip and had friends who went to Kyiv. Bohdan’s friends organized themselves to
travel several times to Kyiv from Lviv. He recalled their first trip was challenging. However, as
they kept returning to Lviv, traveling during the movement became easier as they returned home
and left only for brief times.
Roman, who lives in Kyiv, was able to travel with much ease compared to others. He
had the opportunity to learn about the travels of the people he met on Maidan. Vasyl had the
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most difficulty traveling to Kyiv. Locally, from Berezhany, (a smaller town), to Ternopil, he
traveled with ease. His travels by bus from Ternopil to Lviv were also effortless. Both cities are
well populated. His difficulties began in Lviv on his way to Kyiv, where the hub of activity was
growing. By the time he arrived to the train station, authorities stopped allowing the trains to
travel and shortly thereafter, busses were also halted.

 Weather
The Orange Revolution started at the end of November. Winter already set in with snow
and cold temperatures in Kyiv. The winter elements had to be considered by all who were going
to be outside standing on Independence Square. People responding to Yushchenko’s call to
action to come to Maidan, needed to prepare for winter weather. Bohdan’s friends who traveled
in groups to Kyiv strategized to stand on Maidan in shifts taking breaks while maintaining their
presence. This was their way to stay energized while standing up to the announced election
results. Their plan also helped maintain a constant presence of people on Independence Square.
Roman shared his observations of groups of people who traveled to Kyiv and how they
prepared to withstand the elements. He also keenly observed that people from Central and
Western Ukraine were well prepared to brave the weather for longer periods of time. He noticed
their preparations indicated intent to stay and follow through on Yushchenko’s request. On the
other hand, Roman noticed that people from Eastern Ukraine were less prepared for the winter
conditions. He described how people went underground on Maidan and warmed up in the
shopping area. He also discussed how local Kyivans, himself included, helped those from other
cities stay warm during the movement. He opened his home to protestors to warm up, freshen up
and eat a bowl of warm soup.

69
 Secrets and Confidentiality
With the unity felt on Maidan while battling the cold temperatures, secrecy and
confidentiality still existed. Viktor’s friends cautiously expressed their doubts during the Orange
Revolution. Vasyl indirectly experienced the withholding of information during his travels. The
bus to Kyiv from Lviv was sent back to Lviv by the authorities. The police simply told the
passengers that the road was closed.
In turn, Bohdan’s friends expressed their own secrecy towards the authorities by
returning regularly to Lviv during the movement. His friends spent a few days at home before
returning to Kyiv to further participate in the movement. Maryna was more open in sharing her
sentiment of confidentiality and secrets she held during the Orange Revolution. She maintained
a very cautious approach to any possible conversations about the movement and her opinions
surrounding the topic.
 Anxiety and Concern
Maryna’s feelings of secrecy tie in with the anxiety and concern she felt. She was
cautious and hesitant to share her viewpoint with others. Viktor’s friends also expressed their
concerns for what could happen next in Ukraine. Vasyl’s anxiety came through when traveling
to Kyiv and encountered obstacles. He was determined to travel regardless of the challenges.
Roman shared the anxiety felt by the two young men from Dnipropetrovs’k who defected upon
arriving to Kyiv. They were unsure how they would be received, especially as they were initially
sent to Independence Square for a different purpose.
 Sharing and Teamwork
Examples of sharing and teamwork were profound with my participants. This
emphasizes a sense of unity coming from civil society. Viktor noticed this sentiment from a
general view. He observed the people together were empowered to demand change.
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Bohdan, who did not travel to Kyiv with his friends, stayed in Lviv. He assisted his
friends when they were in Kyiv by house sitting and helping manage everyday activities.
Bohdan’s friends traveling back and forth to Kyiv also worked together on Maidan by taking
turns standing out in the cold.
Roman also saw teamwork and sharing on Maidan. He helped others by opening his
house, talking with new friends and sharing experiences during the movement. He saw people
while warming up in the shopping area under Maidan, took turns charging cell phones in the
outlets. He also learned of teamwork and sharing when fellow protestors embraced the
Yanukovych defectors. He detailed the outpouring of support and a sense of welcome they
received along with warm clothes and food.
 Maidan Nezalezhnosti’s Representation
Maidan Nezalezhnosti was the main location for the Orange Revolution. People
congregated here, responding to Yushchenko’s request. It was the central hub for the movement.
My participants who traveled to partake in the Orange Revolution protests, desired this place as
their final destination. For Vasyl, it was the place to be to experience the event. He wanted to be
part of the movement and witness it firsthand. Ultimately, he wanted “to be part of history.”
Bohdan and Petro associated Maidan with being the central location of the movement. They
experienced the protests through their friends’ primary participation. Roman found Maidan to be
the common ground to unite citizens participating in the movement. It was the place where they
all took a stand on the election and raised a collective voice.

Outcomes and Results
After the Orange Revolution, much was hoped for and expected. Commonly, feelings of
optimism, pessimism and caution followed. Additional hopes for globalization, Westernization,
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travel opportunities and the release of Soviet-style practices were expressed and desired. All of
these desires circled the hope for state advancement.

 Optimism
Almost everyone who shared their experiences with me expressed optimism for growth,
development and advancement of the state after the election. They hoped for lawfulness to be
instilled and corruption to decrease. Sophia was optimistic for state growth and development.
She was also hopeful for improvements citizens could experience. Petro and Viktor’s optimism
aligned with Sophia’s. Bohdan and Mykola hoped for more happiness and a better quality of
life. Danylo was optimistic his company would grow. He hoped for more opportunities
overseas and travels outside of Ukraine for the people he recruits.

 Pessimism and Caution
During the election, some of Viktor’s friends were cautious about taking a stance for a
particular candidate. He was disappointed about the falsified election results. Sophia’s friends
grew pessimistic after the Orange Revolution to secure solid employment within Ukraine.
Bohdan shared his observation of the lack of hope he sees in others’ eyes.

 Globalization, Westernization and Travel
Globalization, striving towards Westernization and enhancing relations with Europe were
common themes also desired by my participants. Sophia’s friends began seeking employment
outside of Ukraine and applied for work visas. This was their solution to get the results they
desired to improve their economic and employment opportunities. Danylo commented how the
work abroad students concern him by staying in the United States and not returning home to
complete their university studies. They see this program as an opportunity to escape and leave
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Ukraine. Volodya commented how some businesses are being proactive in attempting to meet
European standards. Petro also expected great improvement within Ukraine’s economy. This
would help strengthen European relations and then further other possible opportunities.

 Release of Soviet-Style Practices
Another commonly desired outcome was to step away from Soviet practices. Petro noted
along with striving towards an equal partnership with Europe, Ukraine would need to step away
from Russia. Maryna hoped to be able to escape the patron-client relation system. Instead of
feeling indebted to someone and needing to pay them back, she wanted more of a “pay it
forward” system. She sought out a way to see how everyone could contribute to the greater
good. Maksym simply wanted to see reforms and democratic elections.

Post-Orange Revolution Expectations
Along with the outcomes and results immediately following the Orange Revolution, my
participants had subsequent expectations. The major common expectation after the movement
was the promised changes verbalized during the election. Primarily, these promised changes
surrounded government reforms, a shift in priorities within the state and its development. There
was hope and optimism for follow through on the promises made. There was also a sense of
dejection or disappointment. Finally, there was the realization that changes were not happening.

 Positive Hope
Vasyl and Bohdan both shared their anticipation for seeing changes become realized.
Both looked forward to a more democratic system. They expected changes to occur essentially
overnight. Taras noted in postage stamps a sense of celebration in the commemorative stamps
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issued after the Orange Revolution. Nadia expected infrastructure within her town to be address
and improved.

 Dejection, Disappointment
With each passing day during the Yushchenko administration, Bohdan and Vasyl started
feeling dejected as changes were not seen or being made. Petro felt patriotism and the
government’s role and activities were merely an illusion. Volodya felt there was no real change
in leadership, and corruption still existed. Viktor also noticed the disappointment felt by many
people around him. He noted that negative changes occurred, and resulted from infighting
among government members.

 Lack of Change
Many said changes never happened. Maksym and Viktor said the main change was how
government members interacted with each other. Both said new friends were made among
government members and new fights started. Nadia felt the lack of urgency while anticipating
making changes in the state to improve life. This was talked about during the campaign, but not
addressed after.

ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Hearing my participants’ personal experiences adds a human element to understanding
the Orange Revolution’s role as a post-socialist urban political movement. It also adds deeper
insight in comprehending how such an event is absorbed by the people who partake in it.
Understanding the impact of this event from the perspective of the state’s citizens further
compliments the basis for executing such movements.
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Post-socialist urban political movements emerge within a state where desired and
expected changes occur very gradually. The public hardly notices these changes. Frustration
with the observed lack of change is present among the public. This creates discourse which
results in protest demanding change. Authority figures and the general population are involved
as the movement is executed. A charismatic leader encourages participation from citizens who
desire greater good in return. To pressure the changes wanted, the protest ensues. The demand
for changing the norm within the system is a way to revive the stagnated transition to a
democratic state. Such is the case for Ukraine. As this time can be volatile, diverse feelings
from people involved emerge.
Many of these sentiments were expressed by my participants through their shared
recollections and observations. They discussed their memories of life under the Soviet system,
the moments surrounding independence in 1991, the transition that followed and seemed to drag
on in their eyes and stagnate. They shared their hopes, desires and growing frustration during the
Kuchma administration when they saw the democratic development they desired and expected
stall. The public was then led by a charismatic leader, Yushchenko and alongside him,
Tymoshenko. They wanted to see change. By means of the 2004 presidential election, the
public seized the opportunity to demand change and return to a more democratic system as
originally promised and planned by the state’s leaders.
The Orange Revolution, through the leadership, was an opportunity for the citizens to
unite. They took a stand together, expressing their demands for changes and eliminate the
corruption they saw within Ukraine. The people were able to raise a common voice on
Independence Square. The movement they embodied was one that held the opportunity to
demand initiation of the changes already expected.
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One big factor considered by the groups supporting Yushchenko and helping to organize
the protest was the weather and season during this event. It was the first part of winter when the
Orange Revolution began. Weather, with cold temperatures, snow and wind could have been
great deterrents for people not to go to Kyiv, let alone stand outside for long periods of time.
Instead, people united because of the weather and worked together. They shared warm layers of
clothes and blankets, warm food and some Kyivans shared their homes. This instilled a grander
sense of community and unity within the protesters.
During the movement, an array of feelings came about. Feelings of fear are commonly
expected surrounding such an event. Maryna was fearful before and during the Orange
Revolution. Her fears surfaced out of her daily life. Fear can also come through the possibility
of the demanded changes not occurring. In essence, an anticipated disappointment can be felt.
These feelings were expressed by several of my participants after the Orange Revolution. Vasyl
felt his effort to travel to Kyiv was possibly done in vain. At the time of the movement, he
wanted to be a part of this event. When he set forth on his journey to Kyiv, his feeling was of
great excitement for the opportunity for change. He was also hopeful during this time.
After the Orange Revolution, feelings that followed after some time were frustration,
disappointment and dissatisfaction. Many of my participants expressed their unhappiness with
the lack of follow through after the movement. Nadia said she anticipated further development
within her town and the surrounding villages. Bohdan expected to see the changes within
government. Instead, the change they experienced was the return to previous stagnation, and the
continuation of corruption.
The feedback from my interview participants verifies that a movement had to occur in
order to promote change within Ukraine. The activities surrounding the 2004 presidential
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election served as the catalyst which brewed the movement. It was the result of the election that
allowed the Orange Revolution to come about and amplify the desire for changes the citizens
wanted to see. My participants reconfirmed that the changes following independence were too
gradual to be noticed. Frustration followed this observation for the stagnation. Citizens sought
out a monumental way to push for the transition initiated previously. Their outlet for this
movement came about with the impending change of authority through the state leader.
The participant who left me with their concluding thoughts reaffirms the Orange
Revolution was in fact a post-socialist urban political movement. This participant’s final
statement, “The current events – they are ‘growth of illness,’ therefore, we should forgive our
leaders, because they know not what they are doing,” sums up many of the feelings and
circumstances surrounding a movement. The referenced “growth of illness” reaffirms the
changes and developments that come with the transition from a socialist system to one that is
more democratic. The adversity that subsequently follows the initial change in the system was
observed by this participant. It is the initial growing pains of a young democratic state.
My participant also noted the state’s leaders need to be forgiven as “they do not know
what they are doing.” The state leaders know how to lead the state. However, it is in what
capacity, under what circumstances and the ramifications that exist under the newer democratic
system which challenges their leadership. All of the state leaders and politicians involved in the
Orange Revolution were still familiar with socialist ways. They, like the public with everyday
happenings, are still learning how to eliminate old practices and remain within democratic
solutions. It is citizens who then push via protest to initiate change. Therefore, the movement
seeks an alternative to what is happening within the state and its stagnation. Collectively, the
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citizens express a sense of wanting out of the dormant ways of the state and return to growth and
development.
On the other hand, Viktor disagreed that the Orange Revolution was a social movement.
He felt the event was manifested by public consciousness. Based on his statement, it appears he
would agree that the Orange Revolution was simply a burst of pent up frustration. This
contradicts my hypothesis of this particular movement. However, his comments reconfirm that
he did not feel that the movement revolutionized his life or the lives of those around him. This
coincides simply and clearly with the feedback from other interview participants.
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HYPOTHESIS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT__________________________
REVIEW OF KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS
The Orange Revolution’s intent was straightforward, even with the numerous complex
factors existing just before its onset. This assisted in shaping it into a politically charged postsocialist urban movement. Several of my research materials concluded that the Orange
Revolution was several movements in one. Arguments were presented that this movement was a
technological revolution, a protest against corruption and cronyism, and a political protest
surrounded by what is presumably the “longest rock concert in history” (Klid, 2007, 118). All of
these arguments defining the Orange Revolution accurately explain various aspects of the
protest. Ironically, the role of music and the ongoing “rock concert” was never addressed or
acknowledged by my interview participants.
Technologically, the media usage of cell phones, text messaging, internet and email
played an incredible role among the people participating. Strong anti-corruption sentiments were
felt by those who sought and demanded changes within the political system. Ongoing
entertainment between news updates on Independence Square aided to keep protestors’ spirits
positive while listening to some of their favorite Ukrainian music groups. However, not even the
execution of the Orange Revolution could have been possible without the people from all facets
of Ukrainian society within the state. Without the people, the Orange Revolution would not have
occurred. Participation of people from all sectors of society must be reviewed. This includes
politicians from various political groups in the state, celebrities, athletes, musicians and citizens.
Ultimately, the Orange Revolution emerged surrounding the 2004 presidential election.
Up to that point, the people’s frustration of what they saw and desired as an end result for the
state reaffirmed the immediate political goals of increasing civil participation and government
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transparency. This aided in motivating the initiation of the movement. The event was therefore,
made possible by the election’s announced results.
Shortly after the Orange Revolution, scholar Taras Kuzio acknowledged that the event
and the mass protests’ strength emerged from three separate sectors of Ukrainian society: civil
society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the narod (people) who provided
the power behind the crowds, and the defectors from the party in command, who turned their
backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29).

KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS
Civil Society and Opposition Groups
Pora was the central cog for organizing and rallying people. It was Yushchenko’s main
support group who wanted democracy reinstalled in Ukraine. The group worked in two parts
while striving towards enforcing their goal. One part of Pora focused on non-violent protest
methods. The second part of Pora’s efforts was directed at getting people involved to participate
and take a stand in for what they believed. Civil societies like clubs, institutions and NGO’s
were non-existent two decades before.
Alongside Pora were Chysta Ukraina and Znayu! Their missions coincided with Pora’s.
All three wanted a clean, democratic presidential election. Each wanted the system to continue
transitioning from the socialist ways of 20 years before and further establish the newer
democratic system. All needed the support of manpower from society to exist. Chysta Ukraina
assisted Pora in recruiting people to take a stand publicly for a clean democracy and therefore, a
“clean Ukraine” as depicted by their name. Znayu! (translated as “I know!”), directed its efforts
to target and inform the younger generation to vote. They educated this demographic on the
importance of voting and the impact their participation would have on the outcome.
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Yushchenko relied heavily on Pora and its supporting groups. With their help, Pora
became the project manager overseeing participation from the public while maintaining a nonviolent atmosphere. Pora helped set the trend for all protestors to wear something orange.
Anything orange that could be worn was fashionable, including armbands made from orange
ribbons. Pora’s colors, yellow and black, were also popular. The two colors defined the two
parts of Pora – the part focusing and promoting non-violent protests and the other encouraging
participation by standing up for what they wanted.
Yushchenko also relied on his main political supporter, Tymoshenko for help. As she
canvassed on Yushchenko’s behalf, Tymoshenko simply persuaded citizens to vote. She
influenced them further, to vote for Yushchenko and support a democratic structure within the
state. This was fostered by Znayu through their education efforts urging citizens to vote. To
represent each of Ukraine’s 25 oblasts, 25 tents were pitched on Maidan, starting the tent city
(Wilson, 2005a, 123). As the revolution continued and more people arrived, the tent city grew.
Over 1,500 tents were pitched and the makeshift city within Kyiv had a population of over
15,000 (Åslund, eds., 2006, 96). For seventeen days, the public endured the start of winter in
Kyiv. Pora and those in the tent city lived outside starting November 21, 2004 and remained
there until Yushchenko’s inauguration on January 23, 2005. Pora helped oversee the tent city
remained organized, clean and alcohol free. The tent city residents became the key people on
Maidan. Many floated back and forth between their tent home and Independence Square.
Together, these civil society groups, along with the support from Yushchenko’s political
colleagues set the foundation and guidelines for the movement’s execution. Together, during the
Orange Revolution, they were able to publicly express their desire to end corruption, weaken ties
with Russia and return to building democracy and strengthen relationships with the West. All of

81
this further enhanced the drive and motivation for the Orange Revolution. These factors added
fuel to the movement and the election from which it originated.
Pora successfully drew people to sustain the Orange Revolution by their presence on
Maidan. First, the strong support from civic organizations and their cooperation. Second, they
all focused on the younger population – those in their 20’s and 30’s. This demographic totaled
just over half of the people on Maidan (Arel, 2005, 328).

KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS
Narod
Many young voters of the 2004 election were children in 1991, born Soviet citizens.
During their youth, their national identity and citizenship transitioned from Soviet to Ukrainian.
Many of the youngest voters experienced a cultural identity crisis while growing up. Like their
parents, this younger generation experienced life under Soviet rule. Together, they celebrated
independence and the start of a new way of life. Then, they experienced stagnation in the
transition towards democracy and growth while realizing Ukraine’s potential of being a strong
state. Kuzio refers to this age group as “Generation Orange” (Kuzio, 2005, 39). They saw,
learned about and experienced democracy and freedom – rights unthinkable under Communism.
They also began learning about life under a different ruling environment, which like them was
young, and at times needed guidance.
Before the Orange Revolution, many of Ukraine’s younger citizens, eligible to vote were
apathetic and neutral towards politics. The previous generation of Ukraine’s youngest voters
was proactive just before the fall of the Soviet curtain. Shortly before independence, the youth
observed and expressed nationalism by speaking in Ukrainian more regularly. They also
expressed themselves through pop culture, especially via music. The trend of music appeared
again during the Orange Revolution.
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Helping the narod be more openly expressive and participate were celebrities not
involved in politics. Athletes, solo musicians and music groups became visual and audio
supporters for the candidates. Boxing champion brothers, Wladimir and Vitaly Klitschko
supported Yushchenko. Soccer star, Andri Shevchenko supported Yanukovych. Shevchenko’s
decision to support Yanukovych and encouragement of others to also do so was ill-taken by his
fans. Many of his fans protested outwardly during soccer games, including in Donetsk.
Musicians and pop-stars supporting the candidates had the opportunity to express their
preference and participate in the campaigns. They participated at various rallies by performing.
This has become common practice in Ukraine to further garner voter support (Klid, 2007, 119).
This activity becomes a win-win situation for both musicians and candidates. Musicians cannot
always afford to incur expenses for concert tours in Ukraine. This gives the musicians the
opportunity to perform and increase their popularity. Candidates then, get additional public
support from the musicians’ fan base. Additionally, the narod wins by having the opportunity to
support their preferred candidate and enjoy musical entertainment.
Music helped unite the younger generation non-evasively which encouraged their
participation by voting and standing on Maidan. During the election campaign, some pop stars
outwardly expressed their political opinions. Singers Mariia Burmaka, Taras Chubai and Oleh
Skrypka signed an open letter declaring their concern Ukraine would become a “Third World
dictatorship” (Klid, 2007, 123). Many singers openly expressed the importance of the 2004
elections and their concerns for Ukraine if corruption and crony capitalism continued to exist.
During the campaign, musicians became a sounding board for the candidates. Their own
political desires were expressed while endorsing the candidates through moral support. Having
musicians perform during the Orange Revolution made the event sort of a “political Woodstock.”
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“In total, 22 singers and groups performed in support of Yushchenko, and 38 performed for
Yanukovych’s events” (Klid, 2007, 119). Many musicians who performed on Maidan during the
Orange Revolution, are still associated with the event based on their performances. Several of
the groups’ songs are canonized in this movement, based on their lyrics. These songs expressed
in poetic form the narod’s feelings.
Many of the song lyrics sung by music groups, supporting Yushchenko, expressed the
narod’s feelings and sentiments. The lyrics became the voice for the citizens to articulate their
opinions and desires. Okean El’zy performed often and regularly on Maidan. Many of their
song lyrics resonated with citizens and urged them to participate and vote. Greenjolly, a band
from Ivano-Frankivsk wrote a rap song that became the anthem of the Orange Revolution. The
lyrics were clear and direct, stating the public’s disenchantment with the government and
leadership. It further empowered citizens reiterating they are not alone; and together they will
not back down. Between the music, their artists, cultural icons and leadership of Pora, the narod
was guided to unite. The music also aided in drawing people to Maidan and stay there. It
entertained them, which in turn helped to maintain an upbeat atmosphere.
As younger citizens were familiar with these pop-culture icons, they turned to them for
inspiration to express their personal preferences for political leadership. Today’s youth looked
up to these figures much like the younger generation of Ukrainians in the 1890’s who turned to
Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Mazepa, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and King Danylo for their aspirations
toward democratic ideologies (Klid, 2004, 270). Oleh Skrypka from the music group Plach
Ieremii decided to publicly support Yushchenko on the basis “that the time had arrived to take a
strong civic position” (Klid, 2007, 122). Singers supporting Yushchenko encouraged the
students attending their rallies not to let Yanukovych’s camp intimidate them into voting a
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particular way. Bullying tactics by university professors and administrators included threats of
evictions from student dormitories if they voted against Yanukovych (Karatnycky, 2005b, 4).

KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS
Defectors
The third group from society that contributed to the masses of the Orange Revolution is
the defectors from Kuchma, Yanukovych and the oligarchs. With the Orange Revolution’s
onset, both political figures and cultural icons supporting Yanukovych and Kuchma’s central
group absconded to support Yushchenko instead. One defector Kuzio acknowledged is Yevhen
Marchuk. He served as defense minister until the summer of 2004. Other defectors include
celebrities and stars who did not immediately verbalize their support for either candidate. Their
neutralism until the last minute – closer to the election – can be considered defecting from
Yanukovych, as he was counting on their vote and support. Some, like Sviatoslav Vakarchuk,
for example, did not reveal for whom they would vote. Their silence and initial announcement
of remaining neutral before supporting Yushchenko at the last minute defines these people as
defectors.
Vakarchuk, the lead singer of Okean El’zy, one of Ukraine’s top bands, remained
apolitical during most of the campaign. As a musician, he felt he should not participate directly
in the election or express his political preferences. He believed everyone should participate in
the election and understand the importance of participating. In October 2004, he stated,
“I do not want to go to the political barricades – I am being pushed there by life and my
conscience… Today, all of us have to speak out. This is our civic duty. Because when
you are asked, for instance, ‘Does Ukraine need to be independent?’, you cannot answer,
‘Don’t bug me – that’s politics.’ It is understood that these elections will decide the
future of the country.”(Klid, 2007, 122).
Closer to the election, Vakarchuk expressed his support for Yushchenko. However, he did not
endorse Yushchenko. Vakarchuk was named and accepted the position of adviser to
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Yushchenko on youth policies (Klid, 2007, 124). Showing direct support by participating in
campaigning for Yushchenko earlier in the election could have sensationalized the event.
During the campaign, Yanukovych asked pop star singer and Eurovision 2004 winner,
Ruslana Lyzhychko to serve as the Minister of Culture, a position she declined. Before the
election, Lyzhychko remained neutral and did not express her support for either candidate until
the last minute – November 17, 2004 (Klid, 2007, 122). She then declared her support for
Yushchenko. At the Orange Revolution’s start, Lyzhychko went on hunger strike, protesting the
election’s results. She ate only bread and drank tea.
In both instances, Vakarchuk and Lyzhychko, abstained from supporting either candidate
until closer to the election on November 21. As they appeared to be undecided for so long, their
sudden act to support Yushchenko can be viewed as defecting from Yanukovych. This can be
inferred from Lyzhychko declining Yanukovych’s offering of a government job. The Orange
Revolution’s motivation contributed to the defectors’ support for Yushchenko. Pop-culture
figures and other politicians also defected from their parties to side with Yushchenko. This
helped unite Yushchenko supporters and strengthened the movement.

KUZIO’S ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
Kuzio stated the Orange Revolution emerged from three sectors of society. His argument
factors and accounts for a great majority of what constitutes a social movement. His societal
groupings capture the movement’s overall, general civil contribution. His major sectors are civil
society and opposition groups, the narod and defectors. Kuzio displays a very basic definition
for each group. He keeps the narod broadly defined, simply acknowledging the people who
supported Yushchenko and those who stood on Maidan. How the people are categorized within
society is not addressed or discussed. The participants in the event played a key role. Kuzio
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acknowledges this and the civil society groups – mainly Pora, who drew the narod to
Independence Square and participate in the movement. His broad definitions aid to maintain a
general, theoretical understanding of the peoples’ role.
The three distinct groups Kuzio points out coincide with Roberta Garner’s argument that
a social movement constitutes the people’s collective desire to challenge and change society
within the state. Together, they can seize the moment to initiate change. This is the fundamental
purpose of a social movement. Additionally, his argument that the participants are a necessity
and determining factor for the movement’s occurrence aligns with Garner’s. Kuzio also
acknowledges that discourse regarding Ukraine’s continued development was present within the
state. However, not everything that captures or embodies a social movement is included in
Kuzio’s argument.
A major contributing factor to any social movement is missing from Kuzio’s argument.
In discussing the three groups of society, Kuzio excludes one particular person. This person is
not categorized by these groups, though they are the central focus for the participants. Garner
acknowledges this vital figure within the activity of social movements. Kuzio’s argument lacks
acknowledgement of a charismatic leader. His definition of the emergence of the Orange
Revolution completely excludes Yushchenko, the voice of the collected people.
Furthermore, Yushchenko was not alone with charisma during the movement.
Tymoshenko added her charisma by encouraging participation of others. Without this
leadership, or their energy, the social movement would not have been as strong as it was or
emerged in the way it had. Their promotion of participation greatly influences and aids the role
of the civil society. The leadership adds to the focus and drive of the movement, making it
streamlined and not chaotic like a riot. They set the tone for the movement. The leader
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expresses the voice and preferences of the collective population during such an event. Kuzio
merely blends the leadership into the movement.
The fact that Kuzio does not include the role of a charismatic leader challenges social
movement theory. The leader of the movement holds power over the people participating in the
event. It is because of the leader and their call to action that the participants actually participate,
responding to the request. The leader not only speaks for the people on a higher level and
represents them; this person also guides the movement’s participants on how to proceed, act or
even react during the event.
During this particular social movement, Yushchenko along with Tymoshenko led the
public on Maidan to remain active and stay put until the falsified election results were
overturned. They stressed the importance of remaining non-violent throughout the protest
despite high tensions. Had it not been for the mentorship of the leaders, the Orange Revolution
may not have been the social movement it became. The expectation and tone they set was
further extended through the civil society who set this precedence for the narod.
Kuzio’s argument supports social movement theory. His theory factors a great majority
of what constitutes a movement – the key groups within the state’s society. However, it cannot
fully define the theory as it focuses primarily on the key groups of people involved and their
participation. If the groups of the society do not participate or express interest in making
changes, the masses needed for such a sizeable event will not come about to sustain the
movement. Without the acknowledged discourse experienced by the public, the desire for
change and a charismatic leader; a social movement may have difficulty emerging. Ultimately,
Kuzio’s argument only assesses the general public and its categories.
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The public and the groups of society are not the only ones that embody a movement. He
keeps a centric focus on the majority of the people who want changes to emerge within the state.
The three key groups are essential in understanding the people and what initially motivated them
to participate. Leadership and the pretense of the social movement are not addressed. The
reasoning for the social movement is not captured in Kuzio’s argument. Unless one understands
the Orange Revolution’s motives, Kuzio’s definition may be difficult to fully assess, as it details
one major component for why it occurred and how it was a social movement.

MY RESEARCH COMPARED TO KUZIO’S ARGUMENT
Kuzio’s argument focusing on who comprised the Orange Revolution categorized
participants in three main groups. Ultimately, the largest group consisted of the narod. My
interview participants fall under the narod category. They voted in the election for their
preferred candidate. Some did not openly disclose for whom they voted; however, they alluded
to whom they supported. Almost all of my participants expressed their desire for change to
occur both prior to and as a result of the Orange Revolution. Regardless of their preference, they
were captivated and motivated to vote and participate due to the leadership’s displayed charisma
and energy. All acknowledged that discourse existed within Ukraine before the election.
Many of my participants expressed their desire for change under the Kuchma
administration. Some changes were desired for the government systems and others in their
personal lives, affected by the developing discourse. They felt that if changes would occur to
positively impact their lives, the discourse would diminish further growth within the state. Many
of my participants not only felt a sense of obligation to participate in the movement; but also felt
their participation would pressure changes to occur. Their motivation and captivation to take
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part in the movement was further ignited by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and others who
expressed the value, need and potential future benefit to be part of the Orange Revolution.
Through my research, I learned about a group of defectors from Donetsk sent to Maidan
to counter protest. Upon arrival in Kyiv, they defected from Yanukovych and joined the
movement. Their act of defecting added them to Kuzio’s third group of people. Had they not
defected upon arrival and decided to continue supporting Yanukovych, they would not be
accounted for in Kuzio’s statement. I feel my research coincides and compliments Kuzio’s
theory. My findings expand his determination of how the movement emerged within society.
Additionally, my new research displayed how the narod participated and worked together during
the movement. These firsthand accounts add a solid dimension to Kuzio’s argument and
compliment it with a true human element.
Yushchenko’s role as the leader of the movement emphasizes that the Orange Revolution
was the result of a falsified election vote. His declaration of a call to action, which the public
responded to, caused the eruption of the movement. Several of my participants mentioned the
political promises made during the election and the Orange Revolution. These statements further
encouraged their participation, as they anticipated the reward, or appreciation of their support to
be the changes voiced, come to life.
Many of my participants shared their reasoning for voting during the election and taking
their stance publically. Many concluded their motivation for participating resulted in their desire
for change within Ukraine. They felt it was an opportunity to clearly express their opinions of
what was occurring and the desired result in exchange. Many were captivated by Yushchenko’s
political platform and what he wanted to change once he became president. As Yushchenko
stood for many of the ideals that aligned with those of my participants, they were further
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motivated to partake in the movement. Their involvement showed their support for Yushchenko.
The movement was their way to counteract the announced falsified vote. As so many people
constituting the narod came out to Independence Square to strengthen the Orange Revolution,
they in turn made the event into an urban political movement.
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CONCLUSION_____________________________________________________
After reviewing post-socialist urban political movements, specifically, Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution, we can observe and better understand how such events are initiated and executed.
Their intent is also better understood. These movements consistently seek change within their
state. In order for change to emerge, the movement then occurs. Though the premise behind
these movements remains the same, they way the event comes about varies. The desire for
change to occur is expressed by the people of the state. Therefore, post-socialist urban political
movements serve as the catalyst for change to erupt.
This thesis reviewed urban social movements, and focused on Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution of 2004 as its case study. In this project, such movements were the focal point of
understanding how urban political movements come about within a state’s society. In order for
the Orange Revolution to qualify as a post-socialist urban political movement, a set of criteria
had to be met. First, socialism was once the norm in Ukraine under the Soviet Union. However,
when Ukraine declared its independence, a new governmental system was brought in and
implemented. The transition that followed for a more democratic system stagnated during its
development. Uncertainty and unfamiliarity with the new structure’s ramifications were
challenged by the previous socialist practices.
The public saw the stagnation but was unsure how to enact change to impact the newer
system. Their frustration and tension built, pushing for the desired changes to be implemented
and practiced. Despite these feelings, nothing changed within the state. Then, at a pivotal
moment, a charismatic leader comes onto the scene and becomes the voice of the people. This
person leads the public in expressing their desired changes. At this turning point, people voice
what they want to see occur in the state. Ultimately, for the movement to be effective and
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successful, it must first be well organized, with purpose and emerge in response to one key
event.
Looking at Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, this post-socialist urban political movement is
defined as a pro-democracy protest. After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the
government agreed to focus on establishing a democratic system after 70 years of communism.
The new system involving democratic methods had a difficult time developing under Kuchma.
Democratic initiatives slowed, as oligarchic activity and corruption increased. Yushchenko,
along with the public saw this stagnation. With his previous political involvement and prior
attempts to return Ukraine toward democratic growth, he used the political situation as a
presidential candidate to his benefit. Yushchenko then became the face of democracy and hope
of a more secure democratic system for Ukraine’s citizens. By doing so, Yushchenko
established himself as the Orange Revolution’s charismatic leader.
Protesting the skewed outcome of the presidential election was a way to express
dissatisfaction with the outgoing regime. Previous protests declaring the citizens’ frustrations
occurred, but quickly fizzled due to their lack of support. The minimal size was enough for
Kuchma and government to ignore complaints, or threaten the demonstrators with arrest. The
Orange Revolution, however held consequences that were unanticipated by Kuchma and his
administration. The cumulative and indirect effects among others mediated by the overall
environment, both socially and physically, did not fit the casual structure of previous protests
(Tilly, 2002, 9). Ironically, this contributed to the strength of the movement.
The blending of communist and anti-communist members within parliament, although
fair for expressing the voices of all parties created diffusion. This stalled overall growth. Under
Kuchma’s administration, a sense of uncertainty emerged as stagnation and Europeanization
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were replaced by privatization and corruption. Essentially, this broke down a system which
needed repair. During Kuchma’s presidency, the government began working more for itself
opposed for the people. This sentiment then, gave way to a sense of uncertainty citizens felt.
Additionally, media censorship emerged, further aiding in uncertain sentiments of the public.
Ultimately, these feelings encouraged the motivation for change to occur from within, thereby
allowing the opportunity for the post-socialist urban political movement to occur.
Yushchenko, as a charismatic leader, successfully rallied the people to support him both
electorally, and to push for reform within the government to make its work more open.
Reminders of encouragement emerged to eliminate corruption and aim towards Europeanization
with eventual goals of ascension into global organizations. The high corruption that existed in
government before and upon Yushchenko’s inauguration, also affected the condition of the state,
making it more disastrous than previously believed. Additionally, Yushchenko’s strong
campaign push to rectify government into a properly democratic functioning unit, and the
realities of all this as part of daily life vanished. Essentially, “the leader interprets “reality” for
his followers in a way that makes them susceptible to mistaken perceptions of society that lead to
the end rather than the success of the movement” (Garner, 1996, 27).
The Orange Revolution was successful in terms of a social movement. It succeeded in
gathering the public to stand up for elections free of manipulation. The event pressured the
existing government not to execute their pre-planned celebratory events and start acknowledging
Yanukovych was elected by forced means of bribery, vote manipulations and bullying. This
resulted in an overthrow of the government, allowing Yushchenko to officially take office.
One noteworthy point within the specific discussion of Ukraine and its politics revolves
around the state’s politicians. All of Ukraine’s politicians, regardless of their political party
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affiliation, are still under the same training, based in communism. All still have close
connections, relations and understandings with communistic manners for addressing state
concerns and potential improvement. This is not a fault, instead, it is what they experienced
during their childhoods and their initial training received upon entering politics. The approaches
they learned are continuing through rote, even as they attempt to change their old ways.
Yushchenko acknowledged during his campaign that the 2004 presidential election was a
time for change within Ukraine. This selling point gave the public the opportunity to express
themselves by voting for a president. Kuchma’s approval rating continuously declined during
his second term in office. His popularity drastically declined during the Gongadze murder
investigation. Once he denied involvement, Kuchma lost the public’s trust. Ultimately, this was
the demise of Kuchma’s image, which he desperately tried to recover throughout the remainder
of his presidency.
Many viewed Yushchenko as a hero who wanted to change Ukraine for the better. They
more fully supported him as he clearly laid out his political platform and the tasks he wanted to
complete during a five year term in office. Others saw him as being a God-like figure, who
wanted to change Ukraine and immediately execute the changes he proposed.
The Orange Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Kuchma regime out of office.
The Orange Revolution imminently failed in the long run as the government led by Yushchenko
dealt with much infighting and corruption. The transparency and democratic growth spoken of
during the campaign had difficulty being initiated. Additionally, promises Yushchenko made
during the campaign were not being fulfilled in the set out timeframe. During the campaign and
throughout the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko was considered a charismatic leader. This came
about through his grassroots campaign during the summer and fall of 2004 before the election.
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His charisma and energy while expressing his desire to change Ukraine attracted the public to
him. Though, this was an appealing quality for Yushchenko, it may also have been his demise.
Arguably, the Orange Revolution was a well-organized event as the crowds were
controlled and expected to remain calm and not resort to violence. The precedence also followed
the set of rules as stated by Pora both within the tent city and on Independence Square. All of
this was accomplished per Yushchenko’s request and Pora’s leadership and assistance in
recruiting people while stressing the importance of remaining non-violent at all times. In the
end, the peacefulness aided to keep the protests as a revolution and not turn into a coupe. Had
the movement escalated and a coupe broke out; arrests, bloodshed and serious military
involvement to combat crowds would have resulted. Additionally, as the main protest occurred
in the capitol city, government buildings and other historical landmarks could have been
susceptible to damage. Had this happened and such destruction followed, an internal civil war
could have potentially emerged. Such escalation could possibly void the original intent of the
movement.
Reviewing this case study and adding Ukraine’s Orange Revolution to the other instances
of post-socialist urban political movements is important for others to see trends emerging in postsocialist states. With time, urban social movements will likely continue occurring in other states
trying to formulate their democracy after socialism. It appears that post-socialist urban political
movements are part of a natural transition in political structures. This is especially true for states
whose democratic system is not solidly established and being upheld. Dissidence emerges
between citizens and government members.
The state’s citizens observe how the state forms, implements and enforces the new
democratic initiatives. When they observe consistent events and activities against or challenging
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democracy, the public responds in due time. Their response comes after a turning point event,
the “last straw,” for the public and results in their reaction. In Ukraine, this turning point was the
2004 presidential election. The public reacted, no longer being passive. The state’s leadership
will react in a way to promote the pre-defined democratic guidelines.
Such movements are becoming a phenomenon. Prior to the Orange Revolution,
movements in Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Georgia occurred. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution
leaders turned to the previous movements and learned from them and furthered their purpose and
execution. Ukraine’s post-socialist urban political movement was the first of these movements
which heavily utilized and relied on technology – specifically the internet and cell phones to
convey updates instantaneously.
Most recently, the political movement in Libya followed and even further enhanced the
trend of using technology to communicate information. As in Ukraine, cell phones and internet
were used to inform citizens of updates. In Libya, Facebook, was also used to inform citizens.
Libya’s movement followed those in Lebanon and Kuwait. It is highly possible to see these
movements continue to emerge in states where the foundation of the political structure changes;
and these transitions encounter either a delay or complete standstill in their development.
My new research findings show what life was like during socialism, and after
independence as well as how the change to democracy stagnated and the effect it had on citizens,
urging them to take a stand to reinforce democratic initiatives. My participants clearly saw from
their own experiences differences in the early years of independence under Kravchuk, when
changes were being implemented; when changes were delayed, and eventually stopped under
Kuchma. They expressed how bureaucracy emerged and returned, delaying the acceptance of
the changes and guidelines of a new political system. To a certain extent, they allowed
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bureaucracy to return to the state, as it was familiar to them and the leadership. However, they
also acknowledged that the transition towards democracy severely slowed, coming to a standstill.
Their motivation to react and respond to the lag was the presidential election. Citizens realized
their beliefs, values and desire for the state aligned with one another. Together, they forged the
Orange Revolution resulting from an election laden with fraud.
The Orange Revolution served as a turning point for people to change a system that was
developing and deviating from the previously set democratic process. With the Orange
Revolution, changes were demanded. Yushchenko became the beacon of light to enforce
changes. After the Orange Revolution, people expected democracy to be implemented, practiced
and used consistently. Hopes were high for immediate results as previously desired changes
took great amounts of time to matriculate or never occurred.
Hearing my participants’ personal testimonials and experiences gives a “view from the
trenches” and better acknowledges the observed discourse within the state. The oral histories
provide a better understanding of the motivation that drove people to Maidan Nezalezhnosti.
People did what they could to take their stance to the street, more locally in their hometown or
neighboring city. Understanding these motivations and emotions felt by people immediately
affected by the activities of the governing body within the state, helps gain a better perspective
on the movement’s potential impact. It also shows the impact of events within the state and how
citizens are affected and influenced. By providing this human element, we have a better
understanding of the reasoning, desire and motivation for not only participation, but the
emergence of the movement.
Assessing these personal stories and the human element that follows, we gain a better
understanding of post-socialist urban political movements. Furthermore, we gain insight into
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their role and impact within a state where structural transitions occur to a more democratic
system. This information helps us to better understand what happens internally within these
states going through a growing process. This information is beneficial to analyze future
movements similar in nature. It will assist in anticipating where other urban movements may
emerge and how they may be executed and ultimately their circumstances.
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